Fortification equipment is one of the most important elements of the engineering support of the battle. Here enter entrenchments, combat materiel, the equipment of shelters for the technology, the shelters for the personnel, the passages of communication, the equipment of observant and command and observation posts. The substantial part of the works on fortification equipment is carried out by personnel of powered rifle (tank) subdivisions, subdivisions of other troops. The role even of simplest forts in the achievement of victory in combat is very great. It suffices to say that the losses from the fire of the enemy of sheltered infantry in comparison with the unsheltered are 4-6 times lower, and from nuclear weapon 10-15 times.
Work on fortifications begins immediately after unit organization of fire system. They continue always when subdivision occupies a region. These works are very labor-consuming and occupy much time. It suffices to say that even a small entrenchment of sub-machine gunner for the shooting lying it occupies from 25 to 40 minutes. For the entrenchments for the tank it is necessary to move to 28 cubic meters of earth. If one considers that tank crew consists of three people, then each of the tankers must move 9 cubic meters of earth. One person per hour, working in average ground, can move to 1 cubic meters. It means, on the fragment of entrenchment for the tank by hand it will be required from 10 to 30 hours.
In a number of cases (hasty occupation of defense, the proximity of the suitable enemy and the like) there is not a lot of time for this. For shortening of the time of fortifying positions, there are the engineers. Thus, the engineer company of tank regiment for these purposes has available nine times [BTU] (bulldozer equipment, hung up to the tank), i.e., along one [BTU] to the tank company. This equipment makes it possible to unearth one tank entrenchment in 30 minutes (plus already 5 man-hours of work by shovels). Furthermore, in the engineer company for the trenches, foundation areas under the shelters, the refuges, the shelters for the technology is a machine [PZM] (regimental excavator). It digs trench with a speed of up to 300 meters per hour, with the fragment of foundation areas its productivity of 150 cubic meters an hour (for the comparison - excavator digs only 40). The possibilities of the engineer battalion of division are considerably higher. Furthermore, front usually has available the specialized battalions of fortification. There in particular there are machines of the type [BTM], which dig trench with a speed of up to 900 meters an hour; [MDK], which trench for the tank dig after 8-10 minutes.
Some explanations according to the military-engineering terminology should be given. The fact is that very in many publications, there are widespread erroneous names. That everything call "field-engineer blade" correctly it is called "small infantry shovel", in abbreviated form [MPL]. The entrenching shovel is called large, standard size shovel.
The open earthen construction for the delivery of fire is called entrenchment. Entrenchment is for pointer, machine gun, grenade launcher, mortar, instrument, tank, the combat vehicle of infantry ([BMP]), armored carrier ([BTR]), antiaircraft site and the like in a word for in all, which can shoot.
Very frequently the entrenchment for the tank is erroneously called caponnier. This is completely incorrect. This word is alien into the literature from the times of forts and fortresses. Caponnier - this is concreted or brick construction, adjoining the fortress wall and intended for the delivery of fire along the walls of fortress for the destruction of those bursting open directly to the walls of the soldiers of enemy. If caponnier makes it possible to conduct fire not to two sides, but into one, then it is called polukaponir.
For non-combat [ie, non shooting] machines (automobiles, communication vehicle, field kitchens, ambulance transport the like), the personnel build the shelters. Their difference from the entrenchments in the fact that they are not possible to conduct fire. In a number of cases and for the shooting technology can be torn off the shelters. Thus, shelter for the tank differs from entrenchment for the tank only by its depth (tank it is hidden in the shelter completely to entire its height).
Different shelters also are built for the shelter of personnel. But, if all shelters for the technology then are named "shelter", then their names are distinguished for the personnel.
Slot is used for the shelter of powered rifle department (and for other small units). Outwardly it is similar in the short section of trench. Slot can be opened and overlapped (it is covered with on top thin logs (by recuperator) and it is put some more by the layer of the earth into 30-60[sm]). Slot must contain not less than 1/3 personnel of department.
Shelter is completely sunk, filled up by the earth construction from the logs, the panels, or the elements of corrugated iron. Shelter is covered from above one or several rows of recuperator and is filled up by the layer of the earth not less than 1.2 meters. Bunks for leisure of personnel inside are equipped, heating furnace is established, electricity can be carried out. Very frequently the shelter is erroneously called mud hut. This in the root is erroneous.
Mud huts, in contrast to the shelters, are surface construction, are arranged in the administrative areas; they are not intended for the shelter of personnel from the fire of enemy. Mud huts are intended for the prolonged stay of personnel and are a kind of the large huts from the logs, covered with the thick layer of turf. Mud huts can have capacities to 100 and even 200 people shelter it, while contains to 13 people. One shelter to the platoon is equipped according to the standards and it must contain 1/3 numbers of platoon. Shelter is not intended for the delivery of fire. Construction similar to the shelter, but equipped with one or several embrasures is called a bunker (wood and earthen weapon emplacement) or bunkder (earth-and-timber weapon emplacement). The same construction, but from the concrete is called DOT (lasting weapon emplacement) or DOS (permanent emplacement).
Refuge is similar to the shelter, but it is more according to the size, it descends into the earth deeper than shelter, has the thicker protective layer of the earth and it is completely hermetically sealed. I.e. inside the refuge cannot penetrate toxic substances, incendiary means. Refuge is equipped filter -[ventillyatsionnoy] installation; in the refuge it is possible to be located in the poisoned zone, the zone of radioactive contamination, without putting on it is anti-gas. Refuge is equipped one to the company and must contain not less than 1/3 personnel of company.
Engineers for guaranteeing the possibility of the rapid device of shelters for the personnel have not only excavating technology, but also finished sets of the elements of shelters and refuges, or saw-mill and lumber-working tools for the work on the front edge or near it. Also they have available means and possibilities for the device of these shelters and entrenchments directly under the fire of enemy. For example, entrenching charge (OZ) allows in by the aid of the directed explosion in 2-3 minutes to unearth by explosive method entrenchment for pointer for the shooting costing (with depth of 1.1 meters.
A large number of other constructions are built besides entrenchments and shelters in the defense area of motorized riflemen and tankers, artillery. This, the first of all observant and command and observation posts, which differ from shelters and entrenchments insignificantly (so sheltered observation post it is shelter with the established inside periscope; open KNP of regiment-commander - this is the section of trench with the cells for the staff officers, several shelters for the radio stations, one refuge).
Ducts of trenchesconnect between themselves the entrenchments of subdivisions or the trenches, which lead into the rear (for the extension of injured, delivery of ammunition, food, completion). Also in the defense area shelters for the injured, for the medical aid stations, are built means of connection, water-supply points, field depots, points of nourishment and the like.
Russias defensive lines have proven to be more resilient than the West had initially anticipated, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the chief of the British Defense Staff admitted 29 September 2023, noting that the Russia-Ukraine conflict could drag on for some time. In actuality, some of those Russian defenses have been stronger than first anticipated, the admiral said.
Russians refer to the new defensive lines - the "Surovikin" line - they have been ordered to dig from Donbas to Crimea as "the Faberge Line," because it is largely good only for show. A name chosen to illustrate for the sake of propaganda all the luxury and the care they devoted to this installation. Given the high cost, it is not surprising that even Z-figures like Igor Girkin (also known as Strelkov/Runov) refer to the Surovikin line as the Faberge Line, drawing attention to its exorbitant construction costs. Igor Girkin (aka Strelkov / Runov) said Dec 22, 2022 " We have a long, positional war ahead ... hiding behind the "Faberge / Surovikin Line" - we will shoot the enemy from such large guns that he will not even dare to approach our positions ..." The term "Surovikin Line" was first used derisively by British tabloid media in late 2022, in reference to the construction of defensive positions under the guidance of Sergey Surovikin. The defensive lines are known to theussians as the Surovikin Line [some Westerns call it the Putin Line], informally named after General Sergei Surovikin, the Russian commander tasked with commanding the Joint Group of Forces in the Special Military Operation Zone between October 2022 and January 2023. It was under Surovikins command that Russia began the large-scale construction of defensive positions in Kherson and Zaporozhye regions in preparation for the long-awaited Ukrainian counteroffensive.The 56-year-old career soldier had racked up nearly 40 years of service with the Soviet and Russian militaries, and has served as the commander-in-chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces since 2017. A veteran of the Soviet War in Afghanistan, where he served as a special forces commando, he also served as a commander during the Second Chechen War in the 2000s, and in Syria in the 2010s, where his command of Russian forces was credited with helping to turn the tide against a cacophony of Western-backed jihadist militias. Surovikin's efficiency and successes on the battlefield have led Western media to smear him with the cartoonish nickname "General Armageddon," purportedly over his "brutal tactics" and "hardline and unorthodox approach to waging war."For reasons that should be clear, the Russian military hasnt exactly rushed to provide details about the precise makeup of its defensive positions. However, media reports and analyses indicate that the defensive lines consists of a complex, multilayered network of infantry trenches, anti-personnel and anti-tank minefields, anti-tank dragons teeth (meter-tall concrete structures designed to slow the advance of enemy armor), as well as elevated earthen berms to shield military equipment. The defensive lines, which run nearly 2,000 km through Kherson and Zaporozhye, as well as Crimea, Donetsk, Lugansk, and Russian regions bordering Ukraine to the north, are partially visible to military planners in Kiev thanks to the armada of NATO satellites tracking the situation on the battlefield. Kyiv's army has broken through Russian lines in southern Ukraine, the general leading the counteroffensive there told US media Saturday, in the latest Ukrainian claims that it is making progress in the Zaporizhzhia area. Ukraine launched its counteroffensive to claw back territory from Russian forces in June 2023. Progress had been slower than expected, with heavily mined territory, but Kyiv has in recent weeks reported making strategic advances in the Zaporizhzhia region. "On the left flank (near the village of Verbove) we have a breakthrough and we continue to advance further," general Oleksandr Tarnavskiy told CNN 23 September 2023. He acknowledged the advance had been slower than Ukraine hoped. "Not as fast as it was expected, not like in the movies about the Second World War," he said in the CNN interview. But he said it was important "not to lose this initiative". Tarnavskiy said recapturing the city of Tokmak some 20 kilometers (12 miles) from the front line would be a major victory for the counteroffensive, because it would allow Ukrainian forces to push further towards occupied Melitopol and annexed Crimea. A minefield at the Tokmak-Melitopol bridgehead blocked the advance of Ukrainian troops for several weeks while sappers slowly cleared the assault route, but now this barrier has been overcome. The Armed Forces of Ukraine have broken through Russia's first defense line. The second, main line is next. Many experts, both Ukrainian and Western, constantly emphasize that the enemy's second line of defense, the so-called "Surovikin line," is less fortified and will be much easier to overcome than the first line.In a commentary to Ukrinform, Oleksandr Kovalenko, a military and political observer of the Information Resistance group, called the second line of defense of the Russian Federation different, but not easier.The depth of the second line of defense can be up to 15 km. The difference between these lines of defense is that the first is total mining: hypertrophied minefields. The second line has a mechanized component."This is a large number of armored personnel carriers, tanks, and artillery. The equipment is deployed on the border with the third line in order to somehow protect themselves from highly effective counter-battery combat by the Defense Forces of Ukraine," the military and political observer explained. - "If earlier our problem was demining, now it is the destruction of iron.Our soldiers have already started this process. In August, an absolute record was set for destroyed Russian artillery - 691 units. Mr. Kovalenko says that this exceeds the capabilities of the Russian military-industrial complex to compensate for such a large loss.Similarly, August was the second highest month in the entire period of the Great War for the destruction of enemy vehicles and fuel and lubricant tanks - 685. More was burned only in March 2022 (865 units), when the occupiers' logistics convoys were destroyed non-stop near Kyiv.But that's not all."There is an interesting nuance. Already during our counteroffensive, the Russians began to use reserves from the second line of defense. And now they have exhausted units on the second line. That is, they have almost no reserves left. They are forced to pull reserves from other footholds. In addition, each unit does not have a full complement of equipment, and the mechanized component is not perfect. So we can say that the Russians on the second line do not have the full functionality of their units to conduct defense."For example, the staffing of the Dnipro and Vostok groups of troops fighting in the South is among the worst in the combat zone. The occupiers simply do not have time to compensate for their losses and provide the units with equipment."From this, we can draw cautious conclusions that the Russians on the second line of defense will put up less resistance than they did on the first line. Although, again, no one is saying that it will be easy for our troops. However, I do not rule out that the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be able to reach Tokmak by the end of September," emphasized Kovalenko.For some reason, Russia is putting what look like tires on top of bombers at numerous airbases. @SatimMonitoring detected unusual changes in the TU-95 and TU-160 bomberâs SAR signatures using @umbraspace SAR imagery of the Engels-2 military base (#Russia). Characteristics of the captured signal reflections don't match the aircraft's known geometry & material composition.Colonel Serhiy Hrabsky, a reserve officer in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, says that the second line of defense of the Russian Federation is not as powerful as the first, but..."The most important thing is that we already have limited maneuverability there. It is an extremely difficult task to gnaw through corridors in dense, continuous minefields. This is a narrow strip of land through which our units could only infiltrate," the military expert emphasizes. - "With the advance to the second line of defense, we still have less dense minefields. However, it is still difficult, it must be understood. But we get the opportunity to maneuver our armored and mechanized units, which allows us to expand this pressure corridor and create the preconditions for entering the operational space. Without unnecessary pathos, the next few days, a couple of weeks will determine the development of the situation in the southern direction."The American edition of The New York Times published a news item: "The Russians have begun using a new tactic in the south, where the Ukrainian offensive continues: they pour flammable substances on their own mined fields, and then, when the Ukrainian army starts moving, they use a drone to drop a grenade, causing fires and explosions."Well, there are two points here.First. We must note that the Russian tactic, which the NYT journalists for some reason call "new," is far from new. The combustible mixture known as Greek fire was used in the Middle Ages. In more recent history, a similar tactic was used during the relatively recent war in Yugoslavia.Second. It is difficult to understand the Russians' intentions, because, in a simple way, by setting fire to their own minefields, they are actually clearing what they themselves have mined. So, should this be to our advantage? So the question is: firstly, why are they doing this, and secondly, will it really help them to deter the Armed Forces of Ukraine?Oleksandr Stupun, spokesman for the Joint Press Center of the Defense Forces in the Tauride sector, said that the tactic of setting minefields on fire to impede the advance of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is not new and has been used by the enemy since 2014. And today it is not a widespread phenomenon."Such actions lead to both positive and negative results for the enemy, because in this way they clear their minefields themselves [so we were not mistaken]. But there are a lot of fools in Russia, so maybe they will continue to do this," says Mr. Stepun.Serhiy Grabsky adds that setting minefields on fire has a short-term effect similar to mortar shelling."When a unit enters a certain area of a minefield, they create a zone of continuous fire with explosions. This is dangerous, but I emphasize the key word - short-term. This is a manifestation of the enemy's desperation, which finds no other way to hold back our units," the reserve colonel said. - "And the third factor is the scorched earth factor, the enemy is doing everything possible to turn these areas into a desert while retreating.Mr. Grabsky added that the occupants, by creating a fire and mine screen in this way, are trying to gain some time, literally half an hour or an hour, to retreat to some positions and gain a foothold there.This is Mykola Malomuzh, Army General, former head of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine in 2005-2010: "The enemy's burning of minefields is amateurish, which indicates their confusion. The second and third lines of Russian defense are weaker. We are able to move forward more effectively. That's why the enemy is confused, because they realize that they will not be able to hold their positions. Therefore, on the one hand, they are suspending our movement for a while. But on the other hand, their minefields are exploding as a result of such actions. So once again: this is amateurishness of the Russians, and it has no prospects."Roman Svitan, a reserve colonel in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, believes that the Ukrainian army could also use similar tactics."We have known about igniting minefields since the war in Yugoslavia. Volumetric detonation bombs can be used to clear the territories on the contact line," the military expert explains. - "At present, we have not cleared even 1% of all mines laid by the Russian Federation in the Tauride direction. And Ukraine has a sufficient supply of high-explosive bombs, as they have hardly been used before." https://read.bradyafrick.com/p/russian-field-fortifications-in-ukraine">Russian field fortifications in Ukraine BRADY AFRICK
Ukraine launched a massive counteroffensive against Russian forces on 04 June 2023, but observers said by early July progress had been slower than expected. Britain's defense ministry said 03 July 2023 Russia had used a massive amount of antitank mines to slow the advance of Ukraine's forces in the country's south. The ministry said that in recent weeks, Russia had prioritized and refined tactics aimed at slowing Ukrainian armored counteroffensive operations in the south. It also said Russia attempted to strike Ukrainian armored vehicles with drones, attack helicopters and artillery. But the ministry added that although Russia has achieved some success with this approach in the early stages of the counteroffensive, its forces continue to suffer from key weaknesses, especially overstretched units and an artillery shortage.Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valery Zaluzhny said that the reason for the slow counteroffensive of Ukraine is the lack of Western weapons and fighters. Zaluzhny recently voiced his displeasure at growing unease in Western capitals and in the press that his troops are not making the expected progress in pushing against well-fortified Russian positions. It "pisses me off," as the general put it in an interview with the Washington Post. "This is not a show that the whole world watches and makes bets. Every meter is given in blood - and so every day."Russias long defensive lines stopped Ukraines counteroffensive dead in its tracks, former head of Estonian Foreign Intelligence Rainer Sachs said 21 June 2023. The Ukrainian militarys Western alliance-trained, equipped, and armed units had thus far failed to reach any strategic objectives ahead of NATOs summit in Vilnius in July 2023. "The Russians have built long defensive lines along the entire length of the front, with the fewest defensive positions in the north. Russia considers it very important to hold onto the southern part of the front, so more defensive lines have been built there. Ukraine attempted to break through the Russian defensive line in three places, but not using very energetic maneuverable units, but rather carefully with artillery fire. So I wouldnt expect very fast or deep progress from such attacks, Sachs said.
The situation with the Aksenov line in Crimea was complicated. According to Sergei Aksenov, the construction of the defense structures in the northern part of the peninsula was initiated by him personally in the interests of territorial defense. However, it is difficult to see anything beyond the mere absorption of funds behind the trenches that were dug in Yevpatoria and other resort areas along the coast.https://riafan.ru/23698323-_liniya_vagnera_voenkori_fan_pokazali_kak_vistraivaetsya_moschnaya_liniya_ukreplenii_v_lnr">"Wagner Line": FAN military correspondents showed how a powerful line of fortifications is being built in the LPR October 15, 2022
The line of contact near Donetsk and Makeevka, from which the Armed Forces of Ukraine can strike at these cities, cannot be "pushed back" for a long time due to many years of building a layered defense by the enemy, Denis Pushilin, acting head of the DPR, said on the Russia-24 TV channel 05 July 2023.In March 2023, the authors of the controversial DSRG Rusich telegram channel noted a number of shortcomings. "the line is built explicitly on the map (and the old one) and in some places the terrain is simply not taken into account. That is, "an anti-tank ditch and a line of concrete "dragon's teeth" on the reverse slope (300 meters from the crest) from the direction of the expected strike, and the trenches are almost in a lowland." The soil excavated from the anti-tank trenches is used to create large embankments, obstructing the firing and observation sectors from the positions. The dugouts feature weak ceilings consisting of a single layer of boards covered with earth. The trenches lack drainage ditches or water pits. "It is extremely unpleasant that the money and resources allocated for this construction often go to waste. Not because of the corruption component (we do not touch on this issue), but simply because of the incompetence and / or impotence of the people who are building it on the ground... "https://sputnikglobe.com/20230622/what-is-surovikin-defensive-line-which-ukrainian-forces-cant-crack-1111393818.html">Surovikin Line
The fortification known variously as the Perekop Wall, Turkish Wall [Türk Seddi] or Tatar Ditch, is up to 45m (150 ft) wide and was originally up to 20m (65 ft) deep. It was anchored at the Perekop end by the now ruined Or-Kapi fortress, from which Perekop takes its name. The Tatar Ditch, originally constructed in the 15th century by the Tatar khan of the Crimea, is now a thirty-foot high rampart running from west to east across the Perekop Isthmus.The territory of Crimea was conquered and controlled many times throughout its history. The Cimmerians, Greeks, Persians, Goths, Huns, Bulgars, Khazars, the state of Kievan Rus', Byzantine Greeks, Kipchaks, Tatars, Kalmyks and the Mongols all controlled Crimea in its early history. Perekop is technically the oldest town on the isthmus a town has existed there since ancient Greek times. the Perekop Isthmus has been recognised for millennia as the gateway to Crimea. A line of fortifications has existed across the isthmus for at least 2,500 years, and has repeatedly been fought over. According to some ancient Russian historical records the Crimea , which was conquered by the Tatars under Batu , had received its name from the town of Kyrym which means in Tatar " ditch." The ancient Greek name for Perekop, Taphros, means 'dug-out place'. It likely reflected the presence of a ditch across the isthmus at this point. The ditch is still there it's clearly visible from space and was fortified further between the 15th and 20th centuries.Perekop played an important part from the very earliest ages, when the place did not even exist under this name. The civilized nations of the Crimea built a wall across the isthmus, which is only three miles in diameter, and anxiously guarded the towers, to prevent inroads of the savage Scyths. The Perekop of the Tatars is indubitably situated on the same spot; but a wall no longer guards the isthmus, for its place is occupied by a deep moat, defended by towers. Hence the rapacious bands of the Tatar khan set out to plunder and devastate the northern Christians. The isthmus was defended by an irregular fortress erected on the S. side of a deep ditch, and protected by a high wall built of freestone, stretching right across the isthmus, which rises slightly in the middle. The fosse and the wall are said to have been formed in ancient times by the inhabitants of the peninsula to defend themselves against the incursions of the nomades of the steppe. The taphros or ditch of the more ancient geographers, and the "new wall" of Ptolemy, lie South of Perekop.The town and fortress were founded in the latter part of the 15th century by the Tartars. They were taken by the Russians first in 1736. In 1738 the fortress was retaken by the Russians, and blown up. Khan Krim-Ghirey repaired the fortifications, but the greater part of the inhabitants, mostly Armenians and Greeks, having suffered much from both Russians and Tartars, removed 5 m. S. of Perekop, and founded the colony of Armianski-Bazar, now a suburb of Perekop. In 1771 the lines of Perekop were stormed once more by the Russians, and the town was finally incorporated with the empire in 1783.The year 1920 was the third year of the Soviet Republic, the third year of the Russian workers' and peasants' heroic struggle in defence of the socialist Motherland. In fierce fighting, the main forces of the internal and external counter-revolution had been routed. The victory won by the Red Army had compelled the Entente to lift the blockade of the Soviet country, while Britain and France were made to withdraw their troops from Russia's territory.The imperialist rulers of the Western powers organised a new armed "crusade" against the land of Soviets. This time the carrying out of their treacherous plan for strangling the republic, which had been drawn up by the British and French 'headquarters, was entrusted to bourgeois-landlord Poland and the White Guard troops of General Wrangel entrenched in the Crimea; Poland was to strike from the west, Wrangel from the south.At this critical moment, the Government of the Soviet Republic decided to set up the Southern Front with Mikhail Frunze, an outstanding proletarian military leader, as its commander. The Front was given the task to wipe out the Wrangel White Guard army in the shortest time, to liberate the Crimea and by no means to allow a winter campaign.To liberate the Crimea was by no means easy. The peninsula is connected with the mainland by the 8 km wide Isthmus of Perekop and by the Arabatskaya Strelka a narrow a narrow strip of land up to 3 kilometres wide and 120 kilometres long. There were two bridges connecting the mainland and the Crimea on the Isthmus of Chongar, but both of them had been blown up by the White Guards. Taking advantage of the geographic position of the Crimean Peninsula, the Whites had set up powerful defences on the Isthmuses of Perekop and Chongar and on the Arabatskaya Strelka, which were considered impregnable. The fortifications were built under the supervision of British, French and American specialists.Especially strong were the enemy defences on the Isthmus of Perekop. The White Guards' main defence line was the Turkish Wall an earth rampart up to 8 m high and 15 m wide at the base. In front of the rampart there were a moat up to 10 m deep and 40 m wide and three rows of barbed-wire entanglements. A line of trenches, dugouts and shelters with over 70 guns and about 150 machine guns ran along the crest of the rampart. The Perekop defences were covered by the guns of 20 warships from the west, whereas the shallow but swampy Sivash Bay protected them from the east.The second belt of fortifications the Yushun positions ran some 20-25 km to the south from the Turkish Wall. It consisted of three and in places four lines of trenches with barbed-wire entanglements. Officers and men of the Southern Front had to fulfil one of the most difficult combat missions that of breaking through a powerful, deeply echeloned positional defence. The 51st Division, under the command of V. Blücher, a Civil War hero, stormed the powerful enemy defences on the Perekop. After a long artillery bombardment, an attack against the Turkish Wall was signalled. The first storming wave rose to attack, then another... But meeting a hurricane of artillery and machine-gun fire, the attackers could not overcome the barbed-wire entanglements. Almost all of them laid down their lives in front of the barbed wire. The regiments fearlessly stormed the formidable wall three times. But only the fourth attack was a success the wall was captured. Without delay the troops pressed swiftly forward to the Yushun positions. Attacked from the Litovsk Peninsula and the Turkish Wall, the White Guards began to leave the Perekop defences. By mid-November, the troops of the Southern Front had freed the Crimea. The Tatar Ditch is fascinating. A huge earthwork that was dug by hand (well, by lots of hands) and was a formidable obstacle that the Germans under Manstein had to overcome in the invasion of Crimea in WW2. Historically, this was the principal gateway to the Crimea with its ancient bulwark, the Tatar Ditch, still posing a formidable obstacle to movement in 1941. Although the fight for the Crimea was a land battle, Manstein's attack bore striking similarity to many Marine amphibious assaults of the past. The terrain of the Crimea made this so. Russian control of the Black Sea prohibited a seaborne turning movement on the right. The Sivash Marsh, commonly called the Putrid Sea, stopped any envelopement of the left flank. The salt marsh was too thick to be negotiated by watercraft or rubber dinghy. Yet, any man who attempted to cross would be quickly swallowed up by the bottomless morass. This left only a four-mile wide stretch of land, the Perekop Isthmus, as an avenue of approach. It was flat, narrow and barren. No vegetation, covered route, or assailable flank existed. Manstein had but one option, a frontal assault across the open plain.The Crimea was occupied by two Soviet armies. Gen F. I. Kuznetsov's 51st Army consisted of eight rifle divisions, four cavalry/ mechanized divisions, and several brigades of naval infantry (Soviet Marines). To make matters worse, the Isthmus was separated from the mainland by a man-made moat that was several centuries old. The Tartar Ditch was about 40 meters deep and 200 meters wide. It constituted a major obstacle. On the far side of this crevice, the Soviets were waiting in a belt of underground, mutually supporting, concrete emplacements about fifteen kilometers in depth. Each was defended by a rifle company and located behind extensive minefields and barbed wire obstacles. All likely attack routes were zeroed in by heavy artillery. Should this line be penetrated, armored reserves were prepared to counter-attack on order. The Perekop Isthmus constituted a very formidable barrier to Manstein's plans.Manstein ordered his 11th Army to adopt tactics familiar to all amphibious planners. Each Russian field position was to be defeated in detail by a small combined arms assault group. Manstein wisely understood that the upcoming slugging match was going to be a section leader's war. The final outcome would be decided by individual initiative and personal heroics, not orders from higher headquarters.Manstein's victory in the Crimea was a personal triumph in many ways. He proved his tactical and managerial skills by defeating a numerically superior foe on two fronts at once. The success of Sturmgeschütz Abtielung 190 proved his skill in military theory as well. In 1935, he had risked his career by arguing for the concept of an assault gun despite high level hostility to such an idea.On 23 July 1943, the Berliner Boersenzeitung stated: "The Crimean Peninsula has now been converted into an impregnable fortress. This rich and splendid corner is ready to repulse any enemy attack. The whole Crimea is surrounded by very powerful fortifications, which together with natural defenses today constitute a very strong defense line."The Germans employed the period which elapsed to perfect their defenses. Every innovation of military technique and all their experience in building fortified zones were brought into play to strengthen the barriers surrounding the Crimea. But these seemingly impregnable fortifications were crushed to dust by the might of the Soviet artillery, air force and tanks, and our military technique generally. Perekop was penetrated to the full depth of the Ishun positions in 34 hours. Eyewitnesses report that from the Turkish Wall to Armyansk there is no patch of ground which is not covered with craters caused by Rusian shells and bombs and which was not strewn with the wreckage of German armament.The success of the break-through was largely due to long and careful preparation. Hitler's Crimean front was pierced and subsequent events developed with lightning speed. Only two days separated the liberation of Simferopol and Evpatoria from the liberation of Dzhankoi, and the liberation of Feodosia from the liberation of Kerch. In each of these three directions Soviet tanks and infantry fought their way forward some hundred kilometers in two days. The Germans wanted a blitzkrieg. They got it. 7777 http://lanserver/military/library/policy/army/fm/100-61/Ch6.htm">Chapter 6 - Army and Army Group Defensive Operations FM 100-61ARMOR- AND MECHANIZED-BASED OPPOSING FORCE OPERATIONAL ARThttps://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2023-03-30/1_1230_horror.html">Positional warfare - the horror of the twentieth centuryWhy Politicians Don't Like Trench Truth Alexander Shirokorad
A shovel is cheaper than a tank. By June 2022, The fighting in Ukraine moved into a static phase, known primarily from World War I. after almost four months of hostilities, it became clear that the planned Russian blitzkrieg had failed, and the situation turned into a trench war of attrition, in which elements of partisan resistance were also clearly present.Positional warfare [poziczionnaya vojna] is a war in which armed struggle is carried out mainly on continuous, relatively stable fronts with defense in depth. Positional warfare involves fighting in certain positions - relatively stable fronts. Battles take place on constant fronts, the boundaries of which practically do not change. The Korean War, the Iranian-Iraqi, Ethiopian-Eritrean wars rolled into positional wars. And also the confrontation between Armenians and Azerbaijanis in Karabakh, and the east of Ukraine should also be attributed to the same format. The first real positional warfare in history broke out at the final stage of the American Civil War 1861-1865 (between the northern Yankees and the southern Dixies). Despite a buoyant start, when the southerners almost took Washington in the first month of the war, the north managed to hold its own. General Lee was from the engineering troops. Therefore, his soldiers began to dig in and build sensible defensive complexes. The transition to positional warfare is explained by the inability (with the existing balance of forces and the level of development of weapons and military equipment) of both sides to make breakthroughs in the opponent's defenses or develop tactical breakthroughs into operational ones. If there are enough forces, weapons and military equipment on both sides, positional warfare makes it possible to make breakthroughs in the opponent's defenses or turn tactical breakthroughs into operational ones.This form of confrontation still has specific features. A continuous front is formed along the entire line of possible contact with the enemy. Positions are equipped with a dense and complex system of engineering barriers, The parties are separated by a "no man's land" - a strip of territory that no one controls (100-250 meters during the First World War, but it happened in different ways). The front line is equipped, in addition to military facilities, with infrastructure for the stay of a large number of people there (latrines and washing places, sometimes baths, laundries, eating places, and so on). The Great War developed not in the way that the governments and the military leadership imagined. The troops were forced to use frontal methods of attack in the absence of open flanks. The army and army group deploy in a series of defensive lines and zones with alternate positions. However, the OPFOR does not intend these lines and zones for use in successive, positional, defensive battles. Prepared positions in depth provide protection and lines or areas for counterpenetration, but the basis of the defense is maneuver and counterstrike against enemy forces trying to reduce prepared defenses.The OPFOR designs its defenses to be penetrated, but at a significant cost to the enemy in casualties, time, momentum, and disruption. This creates the optimum conditions for a counterstrike. The OPFOR then destroys the enemy.For the OPFOR, the basic defense is a positional defense. A defense out of contact with the enemy allows for more extensive engineer preparation consisting of barriers, obstacles, and minefields throughout the depth of the position. However, the defensive concept is not completely static; it involves aggressive maneuver in concert with fixed defensive positions. Positional defenses weaken the attacker, allowing maneuver forces to deliver decisive blows into the enemy's flanks.Defensive operations are essentially a temporary form of combat action. An army or army group assumes the defense when offensive actions are not possible (because of inadequate resources) or when they are undesirable (considering operational and strategic concepts). The following paragraphs describe the circ*mstances when an army or army group might act on the defensive.A defensive operation may be merely a prelude to a decisive counteroffensive. At the beginning of a war, the OPFOR initially may have to meet superior enemy forces with a defensive action to prevent the enemy's seizure of important economic, administrative, and political centers. The defenders may also need to gain time for the mobilization, concentration, and deployment of strategic groupings.In the defense, as well as in the offense, armies and army groups have a first echelon and a second echelon and/or a combined arms reserve. The OPFOR achieves depth in its operational formation for defense by establishing a security zone (when possible) and a series of army and army group defensive lines. Behind each defensive line is a defensive zone, the depth of which largely depends on the number of division defensive positions employed within the zone. The main maneuver forces of the army or army group are within these zones. However, there are also spaces between defensive zones which often contain special reserves, command posts (CPs), missile units, and possibly detached defensive lines and positions. A typical distance of about 15 km between zones allows the possibility of establishing a security zone in front of the defensive line that forms the forward edge of each defensive zone.An army may deploy in two or three defensive lines. The first army defensive line coincides with the forward edge of the defense; the last army defensive line (second or third) is the army defensive line. Behind its first-echelon armies, the army group deploys its second echelon and/or combined arms reserve in one or two army group defensive lines; the rearmost line (first or second) established by the army group is the army group defensive line.The first army defensive zone is normally the main defensive zone; together with the army second defensive zone, it comprises the tactical zone of defense. Everything from the rear edge of the tactical zone of defense back to the rear edge of the army group's rearmost (first or second) defensive zone is part of the operational zone of defense; this includes the army's third defensive zone, if there is one.The system of defensive lines and zones does not mean that OPFOR commanders conduct a static positional defense with all of their forces. Within the various zones, and sometimes between them, reserves and second-echelon forces have planned commitment lines. Should a penetration develop, they would assume blocking (counterpenetration) positions or initiate counterstrikes on these lines. The system of defensive lines and zones, and echelonment within zones, allows room and the necessary forces for maneuver. By dispersing forces laterally and in depth, it also reduces the vulnerability of its defending forces to precision weapon or NBC strikes.OPFOR defensive concepts emphasize the need to delay, defeat, or weaken the enemy offensive as far forward of the main defensive zone as possible. Reconnaissance troops attempt to locate enemy forces and determine enemy intentions. When possible, an army or army group establishes a security zone. An army's security zone may extend forward as far as 15 to 50 km. The depth of such a security zone depends primarily upon the forces, resources, terrain, and time available. The security zone delays, weakens, and deceives the enemy.Using artillery, SSMs, helicopters, and aircraft, OPFOR commanders try to attack the enemy in concentration areas before an attack. The OPFOR conducts counterpreparatory fires to break up and disorganize enemy formations in advance of the main defense zone. Missile and artillery forces locate far forward in initial fire positions to strike the enemy as deeply as possible. They then fall back to planned primary and alternate firing positions in the main defensive zone.A critical part of the defense is the maneuver of combat troops, both from secondary sectors and from the rear, to form concentrations either for counterpenetration or for counterstrikes. This avoids lengthy occupation of the counterstrike sector, which could result in heavy losses during the enemy's preparation. It also fulfills the need for anti-precision-weapon maneuver (that is, the frequent relocation of units to get out from under enemy strikes). Successful, timely maneuver increases the defender's power and makes it possible to defeat a superior enemy force.Deception planners create a "story" or picture of the battlefield the OPFOR wants the enemy to see as reality. The goal is to cause the enemy to commit his forces in a manner that favors the OPFOR's defensive plan. Specifically, the intent is to have the enemy attack and penetrate the defense at a location of the OPFOR's choosing, where it has created a lethal antitank defense and counterstrike to destroy the enemy main force. The OPFOR deception planners understand that, in order to deceive the enemy, they must provide the signatures his intelligence collectors and planners are looking for as indicators of OPFOR activity or assets. The more types of signatures presented, the greater the potential effect of the deception.
The selection of the forward edge of the defense often depends on the conditions in which the army goes onto the defensive. First-echelon forces doing so in the course of an attack usually establish the forward edge of the defense on the lines they have reached. Sometimes the selection occurs only after seizure of more favorable terrain further on. Sometimes, it is desirable to establish the first defensive zone on a favorable line within the depth of friendly territory with forward units providing cover for its preparation.The army commander designates the forward edge; division and brigade commanders confirm it on the ground. Individual division commanders specify the number of defensive positions created and their precise location within the defensive zone of each division.When organizing a defense out of contact with the enemy, the army commander can establish a security zone in front of the main defensive zone.3 This security zone can be up to 15 to 50 km deep. Forces in the security zone may be an army-level, brigade-size forward detachment taken from a second-echelon division and/or smaller forward detachments consisting of reinforced battalions drawn from the second-echelon brigades of first-echelon divisions. A brigade defending in the security zone usually deploys in one echelon of three reinforced battalions. These forces conduct a maneuver defense, withdrawing from one prepared position to another when pressure grows too strong.A security zone serves several purposes, such as to--Detect the enemy's main groupings and intentions.Delay the enemy, allowing the preparation of defense and counterstrikes.Deceive the enemy as to the location and configuration of the main defensive zone.4Force the enemy into premature deployment.Canalize the enemy onto unfavorable axes.First-echelon divisions establish the first defensive zone, which is usually the main defensive zone. Within the main defensive zone, each division can hold three or more positions, with each brigade holding two defensive positions and each battalion, one. The basis of each position is company strongpoints integrated into battalion defensive areas. Each battalion position is 3 to 5 km wide and about 2 km deep, with gaps of up to 5 km between battalions. Generally, a brigade has a frontage and depth of up to 10 km. A division has a sector up to 30 km wide (as little as 20 km on a key axis) and 20 to 25 km deep.The tasks of the first-echelon divisions are to repel enemy attacks, inflict maximum casualties on attacking enemy force groupings, and prevent penetration. Should that be impossible, the tasks become holding vital ground and supporting second-echelon (reserve) counterstrikes.Behind the main defensive zone, an army establishes at least one more defensive zone, and possibly two. A distance of about 15 km typically separates the rear edge of one zone from the forward edge of the next. The location of these zones depends on the terrain, the likely character of enemy actions, and the army's concept of operations. The army's second echelon and/or combined arms reserve occupy these zones. Sometimes, the army has engineers prepare a third defensive zone but does not occupy it initially.The army's first and second defensive zones constitute the tactical zone of defense. A third army zone, if present, is part of the operational zone of defense. The army's second and third zones each can consist of one or two defensive positions. Thus either of these zones is typically 15 to 20 km in depth.The initial deployment area of the army's second echelon is likely to be in the second defensive zone. Its primary mission is to launch a counterstrike and to restore the stability of the tactical zone of defense. However, the situation may require it to perform roles normally associated with the combined arms reserve. For example, the army may have its second echelon reinforce the efforts of the first echelon on the main axis, possibly relieving first-echelon troops that have lost combat effectiveness. The second echelon might have to hold firmly in the second defensive zone to halt enemy penetration. If the army has no combined arms reserve or dedicated antilanding reserve, it may also call on the second echelon to destroy enemy air landings.If a collapse of the first echelon has allowed complete penetration of the tactical zone of defense, the role of the second echelon may be to establish a last line of counterpenetration defense on the enemy's main attack axis. In some cases, elements of the second echelon may have deployed initially in a third defensive zone, with this mission as an option to a counterstrike. Otherwise, elements may have to redeploy to prepared lines in the operational zone of defense for the mission of holding those lines until the army group can mount a decisive counterstrike. Sometimes the second echelon canalizes the enemy forces into an area that allows the army group counterstrike to destroy them.Besides the combined arms reserve, the army commander often creates a dedicated antilanding reserve. Special reserves in the operational formation can include engineer, chemical defense, reconnaissance, communications, and medical reserves. There is always an antitank (AT) reserve based on the army's AT regiment but often reinforced with other artillery and tank and/or mechanized infantry assets. This almost invariably works in tandem with a mobile obstacle detachment (MOD).The AT reserve and MOD deploy on or near the most important or most threatened axis ready to move quickly to prereconnoitered counterpenetration positions. These various types of reserves, when established at army level, typically locate in the second defensive zone or in the space between the first and second zones.
There are several types of defensive action an army can employ depending on the combat circ*mstances. The following paragraphs detail these actions, which parallel those conducted at the army group level.The most decisive engagements, usually inflicting the heaviest casualties, are generally encirclements. Encirclements become more likely in modern warfare, because of the increased mobility of forces and the availability of airborne and heliborne troops to seal the trap. The enemy sees encirclement as a prelude to the destruction of the trapped grouping. Success in accomplishing its elimination usually creates a significant gap in the defender's order of battle. However, an encircled force can contribute materially to the stability of the defense. Aggressive action by the encircled forces, perhaps reinforced or working with airborne forces, can create a battle front in the enemy rear, severely disrupting his C2 and logistics.Perhaps the biggest problem facing a grouping in the process of being enveloped is lack of time to organize to cope with the event. The situation is likely to change rapidly, radically, and unpredictably. Speedy reactions are necessary to maintain combat effectiveness. It is unlikely that an encircled force can break out without the aid of the main force. Indeed, the main force usually plays the major role in the operation and thus dictates the plan. Usually, the axes of the encircled and relieving forces must be convergent, on the shortest route separating them. However, the surprise resulting from the choice of other axes may outweigh the obvious advantages of this.The immediate mission of the breakout grouping is to penetrate the inner arm of the enemy's encirclement. With favorable conditions, the subsequent mission might be to continue the advance against the rear of those enemy forces fighting the main force. Otherwise, the subsequent mission could be to seize and consolidate on an important line (perhaps with the aid of air-delivered troops) until linkup. Screening forces cover both flanks and the rear. Strong combined arms reserves, AT reserves, and MODs may supplement screening forces. Forward detachments are ideal to lead the breakout (and, for deception, on false axes as well). They also serve as raiding detachments to destroy enemy precision weapons and to disrupt C2.
Counterpreparatory Fires
The goal of counterpreparatory fires is to inflict heavy losses and delay enemy forces preparing to attack the forward edge. This is usually an action planned at army group level and executed at the army level. Under some circ*mstances, an army may conduct counterpreparatory fires within its own area in accordance with instructions from the army group commander. Fire support assets involved can include army-level artillery and SSMs, army aviation helicopters, and some support from army group aviation. When it involves artillery from more than one army, army group SSMs, and the main forces of army group aviation, the army group commander organizes it. To conduct counterpreparatory fires, a division needs 3 to 5 hours planning time. Planning at army level might require 6 to 8 hours.A successful counterpreparation needs much artillery--30 to 40 guns, MRLs, and mortars per km of frontage. To produce the right density, the army can involve not only the artillery of the threatened divisions and the AAG but also the weapons of adjacent divisions and sometimes of second-echelon divisions as well. Precision weapons, if available, can reduce the requirements for massed artillery in counterpreparatory fires.To be successful, counterpreparatory fires must also take the enemy by surprise (preferably as the enemy is completing his attack preparations) and be based on accurate reconnaissance data. The counterpreparatory fires usually last 25 to 40 minutes. Fires reach 10 to 30 km over the forward edge (25 to 30 km if supported by army group aviation as well). The OPFOR fire strikes combine fires with EC directed against enemy artillery and air support nets, target acquisition assets, and C2 elements.
Spoiling Attacks
Spoiling attacks may follow the counterpreparatory fires to inflict further casualties, disruption, and delay on enemy forces as they prepare to attack. Usually, the army uses brigade- or battalion-size elements of its second echelon or combined arms reserve in this role to avoid compromising the stability of the defense. A spoiling attack can strike targets of opportunity created by counterpreparatory fires, such as destroying a weakened and isolated enemy unit before it can be reinforced. When the army group does not organize counterpreparatory fires in a particular army's sector, that army may use spoiling attacks to disrupt or delay the enemy attack.
Security Zone Battle
The forces allocated to the security zone conduct a maneuver defense from a series of positions on main approaches. They receive support from allocated artillery units engaging the enemy from temporary firing positions. Division and brigade artillery groups from the main defensive zone may supplement the fires of artillery in the security zone. The artillery groups fire with guns and MRLs generally start to engage targets 15 to 25 km from the forward edge of the main defensive zone. Howitzers typically begin to fire when the enemy is within 10 to 15 km. Also possibly located in the security zone are deep fire systems such as army-level SSMs and MRLs to hit the enemy on distant, as well as, near approaches. During the fight in the security zone, the OPFOR determines the axis of the enemy's main attack. First-echelon divisions improve their defenses by reconfiguring their plans and regrouping as necessary onto critical axes.
Repelling Enemy Attack
During the actual start of the enemy attack, all available weapons open intensive fire to disrupt attacking groupings, to separate tanks from infantry, and to neutralize fire support. They create favorable conditions for the destruction of mechanized forces by AT systems. This occurs regardless of whether or not the army had time to establish a security zone. Once the OPFOR identifies the enemy's axes of attack, it reinforces its defenses on those axes. Reinforcing the axes increases the density of AT weapons and obstacles, and adds depth to the defense. The army commander then adjusts and confirms the missions of aviation, artillery, mobile AT reserves, and other troops.Where the enemy achieves penetration into the main defensive zone, the OPFOR must firmly hold advantageous positions and take measures to prevent enemy advances into the depth or against the flanks of stable defensive groupings. Brigades and divisions mount counterattacks to destroy minor penetrations and to restore the main positions. If faced with a major penetration, however, the second echelons of divisions receive orders to hold deep defensive positions and delay the enemy.
Counterstrike and Counterpenetration
The battle for the tactical zone of defense normally requires not only brigade and division counterattacks but also a counterstrike by the army's second echelon or combined arms reserve. Where the enemy penetrates the main defensive zone on several axes in superior strength, the army's response may be limited to counterpenetration. This is to restore the stability of the defense and to create favorable conditions for launching army group-level counterstrikes. Another means of regaining the initiative is for the OPFOR to concentrate overwhelming force against an enemy supporting effort, while maintaining the defense against the enemy's main effort. Because enemy commanders sometimes reinforce failure, a counterstrike against an enemy supporting effort may cause the enemy to abandon a successful main effort in favor of saving the supporting effort. This type of counterstrike accepts a greater degree of risk to the defense than a counterstrike against the enemy's major penetration. Nevertheless, a counterstrike against a supporting effort does have the potential to achieve decisive results with smaller forces.
Operational art is an integral part of military art, covering the theory and practice of preparing and conducting military operations on an operational scale (operations, battles, strikes) by associations of types and branches of the Armed Forces. In the military theory of many states, instead of the term "O.I." the terms "grand tactic" or "small strategy" were used.After the Russo-Japanese War, Russia's military theorists were the first to propose that combat actions, which in their scale go beyond tactics, but at the same time are not a strategy, into an independent component of military art. During the First World War, a new form of military operations finally took shape - a set of battles and engagements conducted by groupings of the Armed Forces according to a single plan and plan under a single leadership in the interests of solving an operational or strategic task. There was an urgent need to develop a new theory within the framework of military art, reflecting the established practice of conducting military operations. The term "Operational art" was chosen to name this theory.Operational art is a comparatively "fresh layer" in the theory and practice of military operations. It originated when, in the general system of goals and objectives, between the strategic goals of the war and the tactical tasks of the battlefield, median, intermediate goals and tasks arose.Their solution required appropriate operational forms and operational methods of action, which constituted a new subject area of research in military science. The operational art of combating an air (aerospace) enemy appeared even later, when the air attack forces and the anti-aircraft (aerospace) defense forces (air defense, aerospace defense) opposing them reached the level of solving operational tasks.Counter-mobility is the construction of obstacles and emplacement of minefields to delay, disrupt, and destroy the enemy by reinforcement of the terrain. Counter-mobility is an operational requirement for land forces. Operating on land drives the need for an effective combined arms obstacle capability that allows [US] forces to dictate the terms of the enemys movement and maneuver while maintaining friendly freedom of action. Counter-mobility is the manipulation of the battlefields space to friendly advantage while imposing additional costs on enemy movement in terms of constricted space, time, and resources. It has both a physical effect through the denial of access and a cognitive effect through its impact on enemy decision making. Counter-mobility effects can be produced by a variety of weapons or obstacles. Land MinesLand mines are explosive devices that are buried under or on the ground, designed to destroy or disable enemy targets as they pass over or near the mines. Traditionally, they are used in warfare to secure strategic or important areas by denying access to or creating physical barriers for enemy forces.There are two primary types of land mines: anti-personnel mines and anti-tank mines.
- Anti-personnel mines: These mines are designed to injure or kill people. They come in a variety of types, with some designed to cause injuries to a single individual, while others are capable of inflicting casualties on groups.
- Anti-tank mines: These are larger devices designed to disable armored vehicles, including tanks. They typically have a much larger explosive charge than anti-personnel mines and are often pressure-activated.
Russia has historically been one of the largest producers and users of land mines globally. The country possesses a variety of land mines, both anti-personnel and anti-tank, for use in conflicts. These land mines have been employed in various regional conflicts in which Russia has been involved, such as in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and more recently, in the Ukraine crisis.Some of the types of land mines that have been historically produced or used by Russia include:
- PMN and PMN-2 mines: These are blast anti-personnel mines that have been widely used and are often found in post-conflict regions. They are notorious for their high explosive content, which often results in fatal injuries.
- MON series mines: These are a type of directional fragmentation mine, often used in a manner similar to a claymore mine. They can be tripwire-activated or command-detonated.
- TM series mines: These are anti-tank mines. They are usually large metal devices that contain several kilograms of explosives and are activated by pressure from vehicles.
The use of land mines is controversial and has significant humanitarian consequences. The Ottawa Treaty or the Mine Ban Treaty, which came into effect in 1999, prohibits the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel mines. Over 160 countries have joined the treaty. However, several countries, including the US, Russia, and China, have not.Trench warfare is a type of land warfare using occupied fighting lines, primarily made up of trenches, in which troops are well-protected from the enemy's small arms fire and are substantially sheltered from artillery. Although trench warfare has been employed since ancient times, it became particularly notorious in World War I. Its symbol as a futile and bloody form of warfare made it an enduring symbol of that war. Its use decreased with the development of armored vehicles and advances in military tactics that placed a higher emphasis on mobility and maneuverability, such as blitzkrieg, during World War II. Trench warfare was a battle tactic extensively used in many wars throughout history. The Spaniards first used Trench warfare in the 1500s to provide a wide frontage cover while engaged in guerilla warfare. The tactic gained attention as a means ofcover and maneuverability in both Europe and North America where it was used throughout the Civil War, Russo-Japanese war and most notably during World War I.The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) attracted worldwide attention among military authorities that were interested in studying the modern technology and tactics used in war. Many viewed trench warfare to be an effective tactic against enemy advancement. Allied leaders in WWI realized the value ofthe tactic as a defensive measure yet were on the offense in Europe. The prevention ofthe reserves from moving forward and having the ability to occupy the fIrst trench was absolutely necessary for success.This method of warfare became highly developed, and arguably reached its peak, during World War I (19141918), hence it's often particularly associated with this conflict. Each side began the process of digging down, sideways, backwards, and in parallel for the next four years. The trenches were mostly conformed to the ridgelines and high ground, as prescribed in WWI era doctrine. The trench system consists of front trenches with firestep, support trenches, and connecting trenches. When new, the trenches were at a depth of about five feet below ground level, but the top front was lined with sandbags about 2 high. The front trenches had a fire step about 2 high to allow Soldiers to fire over the top. The network spread across France and Belgium for over 500 miles, from Switzerland to the North Sea. Trenches were dug by soldiers to provide a place to shelter from enemy fire, to sleep, and to store food, weapons, and other supplies. A zigzagging pattern was common along much of the front line trenches for extra protection from falling explosives and to aid in slowing down enemies should they infiltrate the lines. Trench systems were complex, often with many interlinking lines of trenches. The typical trench system in World War I consisted of a series of two, three, four, or more trench lines running parallel to each other and being at least 1 mile (1.6 km) apart in depth. Each trench was dug with a step that made it difficult for an enemy to shoot inside.During World War I, barbed wire was used for both defensive purposes and as a trapping mechanism. Soldiers would defend their trenches with barbed wire by installing the barbed wire a distance away on the ground from the tops of their trenches. When used as a trap, artillery and gun fire were sometimes used specifically to direct enemy soldiers into already constructed barbed wire snares.Between the trench lines lay the "no man's land" a barren expanse of land, often full of barbed wire obstacles, that was exposed to enemy fire from both sides. Crossing the no man's land during an offensive was one of the most dangerous parts of trench warfare due to the risk of being targeted by the enemy from the safety of their trenches and the difficulty of advancing through the rough terrain.While providing a measure of protection from the enemy, living conditions in the trenches were often dire. Soldiers had to deal with rats, lice, mud, cold, dampness, and a lack of privacy. Disease was rampant, and the close proximity of the living and dead was psychologically damaging for many soldiers.
Tank Trap
A tank trap is a type of obstacle used to impede the movement of tanks or other armored vehicles on a battlefield. Tank traps take several forms, but their main purpose is to halt or disrupt the progress of armored vehicles, making them easier targets for anti-tank weapons.Here are a few types of tank traps:
- Czech Hedgehog: A simple static anti-tank obstacle, its name comes from its physical appearance, which resembles a hedgehog. It consists of angular pieces of metal, often railroad ties, welded or bolted together in such a way that at least one spike always points upwards, making it difficult for tanks to pass over them without getting stuck or damaged.
- Dragon's Teeth [zuby drakona]: These are square-pyramidal fortifications of reinforced concrete first used during the Second World War. They are arranged in rows and designed to slow down the advance of tanks, causing them to expose their weaker underside armor. It is crucial that these structures be firmly anchored in the ground. If not, they could potentially be moved or toppled by the force of a vehicle impact. Properly anchored dragon's teeth are highly effective at obstructing vehicles, as they are designed to lift the vehicle off the ground upon impact, rendering it immobile.
- Anti-Tank Ditches: These are ditches designed to be too wide [over three meters] or deep for a tank to cross. They can be used in combination with other obstacles for increased effectiveness.
- Explosive Obstacles: These can include anti-tank mines or other explosive devices that are designed to damage or destroy tanks when they pass over or near them.
- Bollards or Blockades: These can be a series of short, sturdy vertical posts that are too closely spaced for a tank to drive through. They can be made of various materials like concrete, steel, or even wood.
- Log obstacles or abatis: These are obstacles formed of cut trees, often used in combination with other types of obstacles to create layered defenses.
The effectiveness of a tank trap largely depends on the type and number of armored vehicles faced, the terrain, and the strategy of the opposing forces. They are most effective when combined with other defensive measures and tactical support.
anti-tank ditch
An anti-tank ditch, also known as a tank trench or tank ditch, is a type of fortification used in warfare with the aim of stopping the advance of enemy tanks or other armored vehicles. The primary purpose of these ditches is to impede movement or completely halt the progress of tanks by creating a physical barrier that is too wide or deep to be crossed by such vehicles.These ditches are often incorporated into broader defensive lines or fortifications. They typically consist of a deep, wide trench [over three meters] that is dug into the earth, with steep sides that make it difficult for tanks to cross. The width and depth of the ditch are generally calculated based on the characteristics of the tanks that are expected to be encountered. In some cases, anti-tank ditches are filled with water to increase their effectiveness. This type of anti-tank ditch is sometimes referred to as an anti-tank moat.It's worth noting that while anti-tank ditches can be effective obstacles, they can be overcome with the right engineering resources, such as bridging vehicles. They are typically used as part of a larger defensive strategy, in combination with other anti-tank measures such as mines, artillery, and anti-tank guns.Russia refined and prioritized its tactics to slow down the Ukrainian anti-tank counter-offensive in southern Ukraine. At the heart of this approach was Russia's massive use of anti-tank mines. In some areas, the density of minefields suggests that Russia may have deployed many more mines than its military doctrine envisaged. After slowing down the Ukrainian advance, Russia attacked Ukrainian armored vehicles with drones, attack helicopters and artillery. Although Russia had some success with this approach in the early stages of Ukraine's counteroffensive, its armed forces continued to suffer from key weaknesses, most notably a lack of artillery ammunition and overloaded units.As of early March 2023, the number of Ukrainian troops along the contact line being accumulated in the city of Zaporozhye and on the border of the Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhye regions, was somewhere between 30-32 thousand in total. The Armed Forces of Ukraine was accumulating troops in the Zaporozhye direction in order to move on to active operations. At least 3,500 fighters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were transferred to the city in just three days, this is very fast. On the border of the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporozhye regions, about 12,000 people have been accumulated precisely for the offensive. There is an accumulation of forces, and this suggests that this attack attempt will be in late March to early April. By mid-February, there were about 25,000 Ukrainian servicemen on the Zaporizhzhya line of contact, and at least 40,000 people must be concentrated in order to switch to active operations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5707180">Belgorod governor supervised the construction of a security line on the border with Ukrainehttps://historyrussia.org/belgorodskaya-zasechnaya-liniya/istoriya-belgorodskoj-zachechnoj-cherty.html
The governor of the Belgorod region, Vyacheslav Gladkov, supervised 06 December 2022, the construction of the so-called security line - a complex of defensive structures on the border with Ukraine. In his Telegram channel , the head of the region said that he had checked the facility together with the vice-governor Vladimir Bazarov, who supervises it. Officials were convinced that "a great job, especially important for ensuring the safety of all residents" is proceeding according to the schedule. At the end of January 2023, the construction of similar fortifications was reported in the neighboring Kursk region.It was called "zachechnoj cherty" by analogy with the defensive line of the 10th-17th centuries. Zasechnye features were created from forest blockages, notches, which alternated with palisades, earthen ramparts and ditches. The depth of the spotting strip in some places reached 2030 km. Fortifications and towers were erected on the forest roads, which were equipped with cannons. The main goal of the notch line was to protect the borders from the raids of the Crimean Tatars.At the end of November, Mr. Gladkov explained during a press conference that the Belgorod barrier line was being built because of the tense situation on the border. Then he did not disclose the details of the work, citing the fact that his information was being monitored quite closely by our enemies: Starting from April, within the framework of our powers, we have been actively engaged in strengthening the borders ... In any case, we are considering several options for the development of events, I hope We won't need pessimistic options."The minister also pointed out that 4.2 thousand builders and more than 600 pieces of equipment were involved in the work at a time. "Lantern" compares the cost of construction with the cost of other large-scale projects in the region. Thus, the publication indicates that the amount declared by the minister is twice the cost of building two prefabricated infection centers built in the region.At the end of October 2022, Vyacheslav Gladkov spoke on social networks for the first time about the construction of some protective structures in the border areas of the region. The photographs accompanying the posts showed concrete tetrahedrons arranged in two rows along the country roads passing by the forest belts. The same tetrahedra are visible in the photo following the results of today's visit of the governor to the construction sites of the notch line. Until December 21, the yellow level of terrorist danger and the ban on launching firecrackers and salutes have been extended in the Belgorod Region.In the Belgorod region, the construction of a "notch line" on the border with Ukraine has been completed. This was during the "Direct Line" said the governor of the region Vyacheslav Gladkov. We have completed it. Finished a long time ago. I hope that the enemy sees to what extent and with what quality it was built, said Gladkov 09 March 2023. According to the Governor, 10 billion rubles were spent on the construction of the defensive structure, which did not come from the regional budget.For the first time, Gladkov showed footage of the construction of the "notch line" in November 2022. The governor then said that the authorities of the Belgorod region "are preparing for various options." In January 2023, it became known that during the construction of the "notch line" at least one settlement was "separated" from the rest of the region, leaving it on the side of the border with Ukraine. There is an operational situation that does not allow drawing [a line] along the border. The presence of individual settlements or farms in front or behind does not mean that someone has abandoned someone or [someone] is not protected, Gladkov said then. According to the governor, the "notch line" is needed in order to sober up those enemies of Russia who "think something bad."The governor of the Kursk region, Roman Starovoit, announced 25 January 2023 his trip to the regions of the region bordering Ukraine, and said that a defense line is being prepared there. "Now the risk of an armed invasion of the territory of the Kursk region by Ukraine is not high," Starovoit said, adding that "the defense capability of the region is being strengthened anyway." The official noted that "the builders work conscientiously," and also stressed that some of the tetrahedrons that are used in the construction of the defensive line are produced by local enterprises.
https://weather.com/weather/monthly/l/aef1ae844a5a6d6514dd32c8f723d7cd1ad4e49f08085207b5c0b336a9d0116dhttps://old-penza.livejournal.com/6812.html">PENZA SECRET LINEZasechnaya cherta / Belgorod LineIn Rus' in the Middle Ages there were defensive structures in their scope and length that were not inferior to the Chinese counterpart. The construction of the "Great notch line" was completed in 1566 and is intended to protect against the raids of the Crimean and Nogai Tatars. The Belgorod Line is one of the most powerful and complex defensive fortifications of the Russian state of the 17th century, which had a length of about 800 km.Abatis is a military term for a field fortification made by cutting down trees. The line was built from the felled trees that were arranged as a barricade. It was also fortified by ditches and earth mounds, palisades, watch towers and natural features like lakes and swamps. There were a large number of fortification lines in Russian history and it is difficult to get good information on them. The lines naturally moved south as the Russian state expanded. The earliest reference to abatis fortifications appears to be in a Novgorod chronicle of 1137-1139. Abatis lines began appearing in southern Rus' in the 13th century. The 'Great Abatis Line' extended from Bryansk to Meschera and was nominally completed in 1566. It was guarded by a local militia of about 35,000 in the second half of the 16th century. Another source gives an annual callup of 65,000. Behind the line was a mobile army headquartered in Tula (6,279 men in 1616, 17,005 in 1636).Zasechnaya cherta (loosely translated as Great Abatis Line or Great Abatis Border) was a chain of fortification lines, created by Grand Duchy of Moscow and later the Tsardom of Russia to protect it from the Crimean-Nogai Raids that ravaged the southern provinces of the country via the Muravsky Trail during the Russo-Crimean Wars. It was south of the original line along the Oka River. It also served as a border between the Muscovite State and the steppe nomads. A fortification line stretching for hundreds of kilometers, the Great Abatis Border is analogous to the Great Wall of China and the Roman limes.The Belgorod Line started at the river Chelnovaya (a tributary of the Tsna) and ended on the river. Vorskla (a tributary of the Dnieper), the Russian-Polish border of that time. It was built from the 30s to the 50s. 17th century The reason for creating a new line of fortifications in southern Russia was the unsuccessful Russian-Polish war for Smolensk in 1632-1634. In the midst of hostilities in 1632 and 1633. numerous Tatar raids hit the southern borders of the country. The nomads took advantage of the absence of Russian troops on the border and heavily devastated the southern districts of the country, taking many hundreds of prisoners into captivity.After the end of the war, the Russian government faced the need to strengthen the southern border of Russia. By this time, cities already existed on the southern borders: Kursk, Voronezh, Belgorod, Lebedyan, Yelets, etc. Some of them later became part of the new Belgorod line, others became its closest rear. The beginning of the construction of the new Line was associated with the construction of the Kozlov fortifications. In 1635 on the river. Voronezh planned to build a new city-fortress. The Boyar Duma appointed voivode M. Speshnev and I. Birkin as the leaders of this project. After a detailed study of the area, the governors decided to put the city on the Kozlovsky tract, on the right bank of Lesnoy Voronezh. The construction of the city lasted from October 11, 1635 to October 16, 1636. In addition to the fortress, field fortifications were erected in 1636, the basis of which was an earthen rampart 28 km long.At the same time, east of the Kozlov fortifications from the river. Chelnovaya to Tsna, fortifications of the Tambov line were built, which administratively did not enter the future Belgorod line, but territorially closed its eastern flank, resting on the powerful Tsnin forest. These two lines of fortifications reliably blocked the Nagai Way between the Voronezh and Tsna rivers, along which the Tatars passed to the Ryazan places, robbed the Verkhotsenskaya volost palace.In 1637, the stolnik A. Buturlin led the construction of the Korchensky and Yablonovsky fortifications, which blocked the Izyum Way. In 1638 the Korocha fortress was moved closer to the Korocha river. At the same time, the facilities of the Yablonovsky section were being built. In the spring of 1637, the construction of the Userd fortress began. It was built on the old settlement. In 1640, the construction of fortified cities on the river was going on. Vorskla. The cities of Volny and Hotmyzhsk were erected. In 1642 - 1645. construction work continued. The fortresses Kostensk, Olshansk, Usman were erected. At the same time, field fortifications were built: ramparts, notches, lines of gouges, etc. By 1645, 9 new cities of the future Belgorod line and Tambov had already appeared in the south of Russia. A common strategy for creating a single line of fortifications was formed.Since 1646, construction work in the south of Russia has been continued. In 1646, the Bolkhovets fortress was built near the river. Seversky Donets, Karpov is being rebuilt. Field fortifications are being erected from the Seversky Donets to Karpov, including an earthen rampart, taras, notches, swamps. In the area of ??the Seversky Donets for the river. Reasonable was also filled with a rampart. The same shaft was built in the bend of the river. Nezhegoli. In 1647, the construction of fortifications began in the area of ??the Kalmius Way. The city of Tsarev-Alekseev was built here. The construction work of the fortress and field fortifications was led by the governor, Prince V.P. Lvov. From Tsarev-Alekseev to Verkhososensk, an earthen rampart was built, and then a notch was made in the forest. Between Oskol and Don in 1647 a new fortress Korotoyak was built, and in June 1648 a residential town Uryv was built.By the middle of the XVII century. begins to form a single continuous line of fortifications. The construction of the Usmansky rampart made it possible to create a continuous line with the Kozlovsky fortifications, having built the towns of Sokolye and Dobroye Gorodishche. In 1650, Belgorod was moved to a new location on the river. Lucky. In 1652, the city of Ostrogozhsk arose on the Belgorod line. By 1653, there were 23 cities on the Belgorod line, in the districts of which 18 thousand service people lived, providing protection for the southern borders. In 1651 - 1654. in Yablonov, there was the governor of the Great Belgorod Regiment, in whose subordination were the garrisons of the western part of the new Line. In connection with the uprising of Bohdan Khmelnitsky in Ukraine and the outbreak of the Russian-Polish war, it was necessary to move the center of the new Line closer to the theater of military operations in Belgorod. It became almost throughout the second half of the 17th century. the main city of the Line, with the exception of a few years, when the center of the Belgorod regiment was moved to Kursk. By 1653, the Belgorod Line, together with the formed Belgorod Regiment, formed a single line of fortifications in Russia with subordination to the Discharge Order. In subsequent years, wooden and earthen fortifications had to be repeatedly repaired, corrected, improved, but the configuration of the Belgorod line did not change.A line of fortifications was erected on the invasion routes of the Crimean and Nogai Tatars, which included a variety of military engineering structures: fortress cities, standing and residential prisons, earthen towns, ramparts with ditches, palisades, gouges, notches, as well as such natural natural obstacles, like rivers, forests and swamps. The New Line was a unique monument of the national military engineering art. The labor of thousands of Russian people, the enormous effort of the entire country, which invested significant financial and human resources in the construction of the Belgorod Line, protected new land acquisitions in Russia, developed large land areas, and ensured the security of the central regions of Russia. The military role of the Belgorod line was preserved until the beginning of the 18th century.It is necessary to pay attention to the names of monuments and their structural elements. Written sources not only preserved the names for many objects, but also contain a large number of fortification terms. Not all of them have an unambiguous interpretation, but there is no doubt that they should be used in archaeological research. Of fundamental importance is the use of the terms "val", "city-fortress", "town", Ostrog (stronghold or fortified point), and Ostrozhek [ prison or field fortification]. Determining the scope of their use leads to the problem of classification.The term "shaft" includes not only the embankment itself, but also the moat accompanying it, and other constructs. "City-fortress" - the administrative center of the site, its largest settlement. Among the "towns" stand out "residential" and "stationary". If residential towns differ from fortified towns only in size and function, then the main feature of stationary towns is the absence of a pronounced cultural layer. In the sources and literature, the terms Ostrog and Ostrozhek are found, but their use seems inconvenient due to ambiguity.In the famous work of V. I. Dal, it is indicated that Ostrog m. old. palisade, or front garden of piles, pointed at the top; every settlement was a small town or a fort, surrounded by a palisade or palisade of pointed stakes and wattle. The first was made hastily, from logs resistant, and a small army was protected by it, or a besieged city was surrounded. The etymology of the name is associated with the verb - plan.There are probably more materials on the Yakutsky Ostrog than on all other fortifications in Siberia taken together. Suffice it to name at least the capital study of N. V. Sultanov, which absorbed the information about the Yakutsk prison known before him. And yet, much remains unexplained. And the main thing was not done - to present at least in a graphic reconstruction the appearance of this magnificent monument of Russian defense architecture of the 17th century.Founded in 1632 as a small fort, Yakutsk was moved to a new location and rebuilt several times. In the last quarter of the 17th century, the fortress was a majestic composition of sixteen towers, several churches and outbuildings. Like many Siberian cities. Yakutsk had powerful chopped walls and the same towers. In addition to the log walls, the city was surrounded by a second belt of walls (guards), repeating the rectangular outlines of the first.Paradoxically, but the study of the fortress began only when the miserable remnants of it remained. They were recorded in drawings, drawings, models and photographs, however, none of the researchers attempted to graphically recreate the figurative and complete characteristics of the Yakut fortress on the basis of documentary sources and still remaining remains. Meanwhile, there is every reason for this, since it is an outstanding work of ancient Russian wooden fortress architecture of the 17th century.At the beginning of the 20th century, N. V. Sultanov wrote: "... bitter for the monument of past glory and insulting for the modern Russian people." He was the first to attempt to collect together the information he knew about the history of Yakutsk. But, unfortunately, there are many contradictions and erroneous conclusions in his work. Away from his attention were some important archival documents related to the history of the Yakut fortress, published in various sources. The main shortcoming of this rich and richly illustrated work is the absence of author's natural studies of the monument. Hence the unconvincing nature of many conclusions and the presumptiveness of individual statements regarding architectural forms and structural elements.The three-dimensional composition of the Yakut wooden fortress reflects the best achievements of ancient Russian fortress architecture. Almost a century of building practice in the harsh conditions of Siberia has found its most concentrated expression here. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the Yakut fortress for the history of fortress wooden architecture, for restoration science and practice.
https://mil.in.ua/en/news/satellite-images-appeared-of-the-wagner-pmc-merciners-fortification-near-the-city-of-hirske-in-the-donbas/https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/22/europe/russia-anti-tank-fortification-intlhttps://twitter.com/thewarzonewire/status/1583911487495868417 Wagner LineThe Russians are creating a defense line in the Luhansk Oblast reminiscent of the Second World War. The defensive line consists of two rows of "dragon's teeth", followed by a trench probably meant to stop vehicles, then firing positions for infantry and vehicles. âPrigozhin and Wagner commanders are likely preparing to defend the positions they think they can realistically holdâ¦and are likely not confident in Russia's ability to defend settlements north of Lysychansk such as Kreminna and Svatove,â the ISW believes.The Rrussian army is trying to create a long-term defense using a number of special engineering means in the area of Hirske village in the Luhansk region. Moreover, it is alleged that the "Wagner" mercenaries are engaged in the "grand construction". The defense line consists of an anti-tank ditch and two rows of anti-tank fortifications, which in the west are called "dragon's teeth" (Drachenzähne in German) for their characteristic pyramidal shape. In the "classic" German version, such a concrete pyramid should not just be put on the ground, but is part of a much more complex engineering structure with a concrete "foundation". The video published by the Russians was outlined by OSINT researcher Benjamin Pittet who identified the geolocation.According to other maps, the fortification line was supposed to defend the part of Luhansk Oblast that was occupied before the Feb. 24 full-scale invasion. The line is also supposed to cover the recently occupied settlements of Lysychansk, Zolote, and Popasna, but excludes Kreminna and Severodonetsk.An almost two-kilometer fortification has been constructed outside the Russian-occupied town of Hirske, in eastern Ukraine, new satellite images from Maxar Technologies show. The fortification comprises of four rows of cement pyramids that the Russians hope will stop any Ukrainian vehicles and tanks from moving eastward. A large trench is located behind the anti-tank fortifications.Additional satellite imagery from the European Space Agency shows that the trench digging was conducted in two parts: the first section of trench was dug starting on September 25; the second section of trench was dug sometime between September 30 and October 5.https://meduza.io/en/news/2022/10/23/two-defensive-lines-appear-in-kurskIn the Belgorod region on Russia's border with Ukraine, construction has started on defensive structures made of concrete blocks, regional governor Vyacheslav Gladkov reported on 22 October 2022. https://comw.org/pda/Defensive-Military-Structures-in-Action.html">Defensive Military Structures in Action:https://meduza.io/en/news/2022/10/23/two-defensive-lines-appear-in-kurskRoman Starovoyt, governor of the Kursk region, says that construction on two reinforced defensive lines is complete in the Kursk region. The Russian Ministry of Defense and the FSB's border administration for the Kursk region jointly constructed the defensive lines, said Starovoyt. He didn't specify their exact location.The Kursk Region plans to build a third line of defense by November 5 after completing two other lines earlier, regional Governor Roman Starovoit said on 23 October 2022. "Work was completed this week on the staffing and construction of two reinforced defense lines in the Kursk Region. <â¦> The third line will be ready by November 5," he said on Telegram.The governor said work on the construction of reinforced defense lines in the Kursk region is done jointly with the Russian Defense Ministry of Defense and the regional office of the border service. "We are ready to repel any encroachments on our territory," he said.Prior to the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet tendency to view the defense as a temporary (and unpleasant) phenomenon forestalled Soviet development of a broad defensive doctrine that addressed such essential questions as requisite strength and integration of numbers and types of weapons necessary to forestall or parry enemy offensive action. Full use of defensive enginneer preparations and the maturation of antitank defense would not occur until 1943, when experience combined with increased quantities of equipment to produce the prerequisites for such defenses. Throughout the winter of 1942-1943, division defenses remained shallow (one defensive belt) and weak in antitank means, thus producing conditions conducive to such Soviet defeats as occurred in the Donbas in February and March 1943.By the summer of 1943, Soviet tactical defenses had evolved from their noncontigpous nature to a dense, deeply echeloned trench defense system, providing greater protection for infantry and a more secure environment for maneuver of forces and fire support weaponry along the front and in the depth of the defense. Soviet tactical defenses at Kursk included a series of defensive positions and belts occupied by rifle companies, battalions, regiments, divisions, and corps that were linked together by engineer measures.The first defensive position, designated to engage the enemy in front of the defenses and to absorb the first enemy blows, involved the most thorough engineer preparation. It consisted of two to three trenchlines and communication trenches, interspersed with engineer obstacles, and was occupi.ed by the two first-echelon rifle battalions of first-echelon rifle regiments. Infantry and heavy weapons in the second and third trenches.Extensive emplayment of engineer resources permitted erection of increasingly elaborate fortifications and obstacles that further improvedthe durability and survivability of the defense. The Central and Voronezh Fronts each constructed three main defensive belts in their sectors, with each subdivided into several zones of fortification. The Soviets employed the labour of over 300,000 civilians.Fortifying each belt was an interconnected web of minefields, barbed-wire fences, anti-tank ditches, deep entrenchments for infantry, anti-tank obstacles, dug-in armoured vehicles, and machine-gun bunkers. Behind the three main defensive belts were three more belts prepared as fallback positions. Soviet Red Army Defense in Depth at the Battle of Kursk was in one word, the most formidable defense the world had ever seen; and probably ever see in many Battles to come.
In Eastern Ukraine, theres supposed to be a cease-fire, but the fighting starts again every night. For two years, soldiers for the self-proclaimed Donetsk Peoples Republic -- with the backing of Russia -- have fought the Ukrainian government to gain autonomy. Donetsk became the focus of military operations after insurgents who left Slavyansk and Kramatorsk when those towns were captured in July and who redeployed here on August 5. Some time earlier, the fighting unit led by Russian officer Igor Girkin aka Strelkov rolled into town.The front line had barely shifted in years.in April 2014, when the Donetsk Peoples Republic and a lesser twin in sedition, the neighboring Luhansk Peoples Republic, broke off from Ukraine. Fearing the whole country might soon be occupied, people like Yaroslav sem*nyaka went to the front. With an ad hoc force of regulars and volunteers, Ukraine counterattacked, pushing the secessionists back toward the border. The Russian military responded with artillery and airstrikes. Tanks without number plates carried soldiers without insignia the little green men, as they came to be known. Intense combat persisted until late 2015, when the front line solidified. The war has been essentially deadlocked since.The boundary separating them from Ukraine is not a border or a front line but the administrative line. That line extends for roughly 250 miles north to south, cutting off the eastern corners of the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts and with them about 6,500 square miles of Ukraine along the Russian border. Europe's only active front line, in Eastern Ukraine. For two years, fighters for the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic, with the backing of Russia, have fought the Ukrainian government to gain autonomy. The West, including the U.S., is backing Ukraine's government; 10,000 people have died.https://riafan.ru/23698323-_liniya_vagnera_voenkori_fan_pokazali_kak_vistraivaetsya_moschnaya_liniya_ukreplenii_v_lnrRussia has, since the summer of 2022, constructed one of the most extensive fortification systems observed since World War II. This extensive network spans nearly 1,000 km, covering an area of approximately 100,000 km². These fortifications are not only present on the front lines but also extend to the rear areas and along the old Russian-Ukrainian border. The exceptional dedication invested in establishing long-term defensive lines, their strategic placement, and the chosen configurations offer valuable insights into the Russian command's strategy and their prevailing priorities in the ongoing conflict with Ukraine.At least 10 billion rubles ($120,000,000) was dedicated solely to the construction of defensive structures in that area. Various lines, such as the Wagner Line, the Surovikin Line, and even the Khrenin Line, have been established along the border regions of Russia and Belarus. Since last autumn, extensive engineering efforts have been undertaken by the Russian side, yet some of the fortifications seem more like projects intended for absorption of budget funds. OSINT analyst Pasi Paroinen has released a comprehensive analysis of a specific stretch (Kopani - Robotyne - Tokmak) where Ukrainian forces are currently engaged in a counterattack. Through satellite imagery, Paroinen illustrated the organized system of fortifications and fortified zones. The Russian forces have established a layered defense spanning approximately 30 kilometers, reaching almost up to Tokmak, with the city itself being prepared for comprehensive defense. Analyst Rob Lee emphasizes that the objective of such fortifications is not to create an impenetrable defense, but rather to impede Ukrainian forces from converting a tactical breakthrough into a strategic one,One of the extensively debated questions regarding the incursions into the Belgorod region by armed formations aligned with Ukraine, namely the Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and the Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR), revolves around how their fighters have managed to breach the defense line known as the abatis line previously constructed in the region.Subversive groups affiliated with the RDK successfully infiltrated the Bryansk region, where authorities had also established defense line footholds and proudly showcased them to Andrei Turchak, the General Secretary of the United Russia party and First Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council, during his inspection visit. Among other things, the politician said at the time: "The advancements made in the Bryansk region can be rightfully characterized as remarkable. The border was reinforced to such an extent that even the tiniest mouse would struggle to get through." Within a few weeks, however, RDK fighters ventured to the border villages of Sushany and Lubechany, recorded a propaganda video there, and safely returned to Ukrainian territory.The abatis line was initially constructed not directly on the border with Ukraine but at some distance from it. As a result, the RDK fighters, for instance, were able to enter Novaya Tavolzhanka or the villages in the Graivoron district without much hindrance. Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov openly acknowledged that the primary objective of the protective structures, surprisingly, was not to safeguard the residents but rather to sober up our enemies. Consequently, numerous settlements were left in front of the rather symbolic defense line, rather than behind it.Defensive structures were constructed along the entire old Russian-Ukrainian border and beyond. Recent satellite imagery showcasing the fortifications erected by the Russians in the occupied territories of Ukraine has captivated observers of the conflict. Particularly striking are the uninterrupted trenches spanning 70 kilometers from the outskirts of Melitopol to the village of Marynivka near Prymorsk on the shores of the Sea of Azov. The magnitude of the trenches, located directly on the Black Sea coast in Crimea, and the lines of concrete barriers within the peninsula, is awe-inspiring. For instance, in the village of Vitino, trenches and rows of anti-tank concrete pyramids (also known as dragon's teeth) can be seen right on the beach. Similar arrangements of pyramids have been installed in multiple rows on the Ak-Monay Isthmus, connecting the Kerch Peninsula with the remainder of Crimea.Some of the constructed lines are evidently meant for demonstration purposes, if not entirely symbolic. Notably, these include the Wagner Line in the Luhansk Region, the Aksenov Line in Crimea, and the abatis lines in the Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod Regions. In the rear areas of the Luhansk region, substantial barriers of concrete anti-tank obstacles have been erected near the towns of Popasna, Lysychansk, and Sievierodonetsk. In the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, they admit that it will be difficult for them to break through the "incredible" lines of defense of the Russian army, writes the British edition of The Telegraph 11 June 2023. "They have incredible trenches and fortifications, it will be difficult to break through their line of defense with minefields. In addition, they have good artillery, and there are more of them than we have," the Ukrainian commander stated.As the article pointed out, Russian troops had prepared a 965-kilometer defensive line consisting of a network of trenches, trenches, dragon's tooth fortifications and minefields. In British intelligence, this network was called one of the most extensive systems of military fortifications in the world, the material noted.Russia suffers considerable losses at the front. The number of even verified by name (according to information about funerals in the Russian Federation itself) exceeds the losses of the USSR in Afghanistan for all the years of the war. According to the General Staff of Ukraine, more than 144,000 Russian servicemen and members of military formations died. This is despite the fact that the number of the group that attacked Ukraine in February 2022 is estimated at 170-180 thousand people.The total grouping of Russian forces along the front line as of October 2022 was estimated at more than 300,000 people. Not all of them were servicemen of the Russian Armed Forces. Soldiers of the Roshvardiya, integrated riot police units, BARS units (24 motorized rifle and 3 tank battalions), Army Corps, so-called LDNR and PMK (not only "Wagner"). Russia can involve groups with a maximum number of about 300-352 thousand people in offensive actions (some of the fighters remain in their locations for various reasons). These data are provided by the intelligence services of Ukraine and European countries.Belgorod Region Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov said defensive installation started to be placed in the region, were areas close to the border are regularly shelled by Ukraine.Russian officials had paused the extension of the fortifications that should have been run to Russia's Belgorod Oblast, on the border with Ukraine near Kharkiv. âPrigozhin accused the Russian bureaucracy â which he characterized as âbureaucrat-enemies'âof âdirectly opposing the interests of the population' and not protecting the Russian population by supporting the construction of the line,â the Telegram message reads.These fortifications would be intended to protect the border between Russia's Belgorod Oblast and Ukraine's Sumy, Kharkiv, and Luhansk oblasts, but notably would not cover northern Luhansk Oblast up to the line of contact with the occupied territories, placing it at odds with Kremlin promises to defend all of the region. [zuby drakona]May 25The #British Challenger-2 tank is training to overcome obstacles in the form of the #Russian so-called "dragon's teeth".These dragon teeth aren't anchored to snything. The WW2 originals on the Westwall had considerable concrete foundations holding them in place. These are literally just concrete pyramids placed with a flat side down.This is Russia in general, the further you get from Moscow, the more money gets siphoned.... All the way until you get to the people who don't know what a toilet is.In WWII dragons teeth were connected to a concrete mat sunk a meter or two underground to reinforce them and help prevent tunneling. They were also integrated into large defensive networks.What I'm seeing here looks like a child's attempt to recreate that.http://lanserver/military/world/europe/de-westwall.htmAccording to Greek mythology, dragon's teeth were sown by Cadmus, the founder and first king of Thebes. Cadmus killed the sacred dragon that guarded the spring of Ares and at the urging of the goddess Athena. He was told to sow the dragons teeth into the earth; where the teeth were planted sprang forth a group of armed warriors, known as the Spartoi. When he threw a stone among them, they began to fight each other until all but five were killed. These survivors helped him build the city of Thebes."Dragon's teeth" (German: Drachenzähne) is also a term used to describe square-pyramidal fortifications of reinforced concrete first used during the Second World War to impede the movement of tanks and mechanized infantry. Dragons teeth are typically square or hexagonal fortifications of reinforced concrete used to restrict mounted mobility. They range in size from 1 to 6 cubic meters and are buried deep into the ground, posing a significant challenge when properly employed.These structures were arranged in lines and fields on potential attack routes, with the intention of disrupting and delaying armored forces. The idea was that tanks would need to navigate around these obstacles, slowing their advance and making them easier targets for anti-tank weapons. Additionally, tanks risked getting their tracks damaged or becoming stuck if they tried to cross these structures.Dragon's teeth were used extensively in the Siegfried Line (Westwall in German) Germany's defensive line along its western border and the Atlantic Wall, the extensive system of coastal defenses and fortifications built by Nazi Germany along the coast of continental Europe during WWII. After World War II, the strategy of using such passive anti-tank obstacles lessened, as tanks became more powerful and capable of crossing or destroying such obstacles, and as aerial warfare and precision-guided weapons became more prevalent. However, they remain a potent symbol of that era.An effective method of breaching a concrete obstacle involves placing a charge at the center of mass; however, depending on unit equipment, this may be impractical to achieve. Because the structure of dragons teeth can vary, it may be necessary to experiment with a different methodologies - one using an internal charge and the other using a counterforce charge. With Internal-Charge Breaching, holes were created using saws, a halligan tool and sledgehammer and C4 was placed in the holes. If there was an advantage to the method, it was the incredible destructive power of the internally placed charge. The results were outstanding; the dragons tooth was completely demolished. There was no need for any sort of debris removal. Time and resource requirements may make this method infeasible in a contested environment.An alternative to internal breaching involves the use of a counterforce charge. By simultaneously detonating two charges placed opposite each other, the concrete is effectively crushed. With the quantity of C4 used suggested by doctrine and each charge primed for simultaneous detonation, the results were underwhelming; the top of the dragons tooth was severed from the base, but a significant chunk of the structure remained. The suboptimal results were thought to be due to charge placement and insufficient explosives. By increasing the quantity of explosives and adjusting charge placement, the obstacle was effectively reduced. Although small chunks of rubble remained after the blast, they could be easily removed.Anti-tank concrete pyramids "dragon's teeth" are produced by at least six Belarusian enterprises and delivered to Russia to create a defense line. A number of Belarusian enterprises immediately received orders for the manufacture of such fortifications. It was about the production of 20-30 thousand pieces, and this is only at the factories of the Gomel region. These " dragon teeth " have the shape of a tetrahedron, they are made from concrete grade M400 or M550 (class B40). This is a special concrete that has high technical characteristics for strength and durability.https://en.defence-ua.com/industries/russia_admits_incapability_to_create_own_stealth_corvette_project_20386_derzky_shut_down-7241.htmlEfforts to develop a new generation corvette for the russian navy end up with no funds to even remake it into an experimental ship. The Russian Project aimed to create a new class of "stealth corvette" (often referred to as frigate in Western sources) has been closed. Namely, Project 20386 Derzky, essentially a modernization of the existing Project 20380, was developed for more than 10 years. The ship itself was laid in 2016 with the budget for all construction works estimated at USD 450 million (or 30 billion rubles at that time). The reason for canceling the project was, as delivered: "novelty index and the cost of Project 20386." To put it simply, russia practically admitted it cannot get a grasp on new technologies because of being backward and lacking in funds. "Further laying down of Project 20386 corvettes in their current form is not planned. Program on their construction will be closed," a defense source told russian state media outlet TASS 07 July 2023. As noted, the ship already undergoing construction will be redesigned and later on handed to the russian Navy.https://christyanderik.wordpress.com/2010/04/24/the-toblerone-trail-an-easy-day-hike-from-geneva/">Toblerone Trailhttps://www.myswitzerland.com/en-us/experiences/route/toblerone-trail-a-former-tank-trap/https://www.toblerones.ch/index.php?lang=frhttps://www.festung-oberland.ch/sperren/grenzbrigade-1/promenthouse/
https://twitter.com/i/status/1661670760459431937https://web.archive.org/web/20150922083405/http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/villa-rose-opens-doors-to-toblerone-ramblers/5442950https://web.archive.org/web/20230417173931/https://riafan.ru/23698192-_liniya_vagnera_kak_sozdaetsya_novii_oboronitel_nii_rubezh_v_lnr">agner Line": how a new defensive line is being created in the LPRStepan Yatsko / Federal News AgencyOn 19 October 2022, Putin signed a decree on martial law in the occupied territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine. This should indicate the Russian presidents confidence in the future. However, on the same day, Prigozhin announced the construction of a defense line and the formation of a peoples militia in the Belgorod region of the Russian Federation.The owner of the "Wagner Group" Yevgeny Prigozhin announced the construction of a fortified "Wagner Line" - a defense in the Russian-occupied Luhansk region. the fortifications called the "Wangers line" are supposed to resemble the "Siegfried line" the "castles in the air" built by the Nazis in 1944. Russian private military company "Wagner" continues to report from the construction of a defense line. The first segment 1.5 km in length was erected in the Luhansk region on the occupied territory of Ukraine, and it is planned to expand to approx. 200 km. It is supposed to stretch from the occupied Svitlodarsk, along the administrative border of Luhansk and Donetsk regions to Lysychansk, and further along the bank of Siverskyi Donets river to the city of Luhansk and the border with the russian federation.The struggle for power and Putins favor among his entourage is probably one of the root causes of the construction of the Wagner Line. As Ukrainian experts note, Prigozhin is not subordinate to the military command and wants to demonstrate to Putin personally that the combat capabilities and capacities of his units are higher than those of the regular armed forces of the Russian Federation.The RIA FAN agency, which is affiliated with the Wagner Group, reported "Wagner PMC fighters are building a powerful line of defense around Lisichansk and in other directions.... The "Musicians" began to strengthen their positions in the LPR, where in some areas only scattered groups of militiamen of the people's republics had previously operated. Now fortified areas are being built here, special equipment is digging anti-tank ditches in case of a counteroffensive by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The situation with Krasny Lyman should not be repeated."In case there is a breakthrough of the enemy, we are ready to meet him. Such fortified areas are being built if the allied forces retreat. "PMC Wagner" is not losing its positions anywhere. Always goes on the offensive even with a small number of fighters. According to the combat regulations, if you advance, you need to outnumber the enemy by 3-5 times. We attack in smaller numbers and win, one of the musicians told reporters of the Federal News Agency."At the same time, deep trenches appear in order to prevent the breakthrough of enemy military equipment and mechanized infantry. The Wagner Line already runs for tens of kilometers and is used competently according to all the rules: with square-pyramidal fortifications made of reinforced concrete and minefields. In the near future, this system will be comparable to the legendary fortifications of past wars - the Mannerheim and Maginot lines. Note that for the construction of fortified areas, machines for extracting pits (MDK-3) are used. With their help, in one working day, it is possible to dig from 800 to 1000 meters of trenches, experts say.""While the special military operation of the Russian Armed Forces in the Donbass is in full swing, the first major defensive center is being created in the Luhansk People's Republic (LPR), which will later become the basis of the security of the new subject of the Russian Federation. The footage of fortifications being built by Wagner PMC engineering units has already spread all over the world and made Western military analysts puzzle over how the new defensive line of the Russian Federation in the Donbass is arranged."How the Wagner Line is being created, what opportunities are open to engineering units and why the new frontier will become an important node for protecting the LPR from encroachments by Ukrainian formations, explains the head of the military-political Telegram channel Astra Militarum, Commissioner Yarrick ."The fact that in the Lugansk People's Republic, which recently became a subject of the Russian Federation following the results of referendums on September 23-27, a new line of defense began to form, it became known a few days ago. According to the information received, engineering units of the Russian PMC Wagner were involved in the construction of the defensive structures in the LPR, in connection with which the new frontier has already been dubbed the Wagner Line in social networks, by analogy with large fortification systems of the last century."Earlier it was reported that the zone of responsibility of the "Wagnerites" in the Donbass has expanded significantly. So, according to sources, about one thousand "musicians", as the Wagner attack aircraft are called on social networks, were sent to the area of ??the Lisichansk-Severodonetsk agglomeration. On these lines, new detachments of volunteers stood on a long line of defense and slowed down the counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In this regard, apparently, it was decided to dig in in the area of ????the line of contact with the enemy and create a defense center in depth."Photographs and satellite images of the new fortifications have been studied in detail by both domestic and Western military analysts. So, according to the Swiss military blogger Benjamin Pitte , who analyzed satellite images of the fortifications, the Wagner Line consists of two rows of anti-tank gouges, called dragon teeth, followed by a trench, which is probably designed to stop vehicles. Following the first row of trenches are firing positions for infantry and equipment, made in a characteristic jagged shape. The Russians are creating a defense line near Luhansk, reminiscent of fortifications from the Second World War, a Western expert thought so."Many analysts, having seen the first photographs of the emerging Wagner Line, immediately began to recall the most famous fortification system of the last century - the Maginot Line, created in 1928-1936. along the Franco-German border. Then, on the borders of France - from Dunkirk to Corsica - an almost continuous defensive fortification line was formed, the main purpose of which was to avoid a surprise attack from Germany and give a signal to start defensive measures. However, such a comparison is hardly appropriate in relation to the defensive complex in the LPR, since even for its time the Maginot Line was an extremely expensive structure. The approximate cost of building all sectors of the line was at least 7.4 billion francs. For this astronomical amount, fortifications 400 km long were built,"Another comparison, closer to our latitudes, made in relation to the "Wagner Line" is an analogy with the Mannerheim Line, a complex of defensive structures on the Karelian Isthmus, which was stormed by the Red Army during the Winter War of 1939-1940. From the point of view of building a defensive line, indeed, there is a similarity between the Luhansk and Finnish fortification complexes, in particular, this concerns concrete gouges and the organization of several rows of fortifications."However, there is a critical difference in that the Mannerheim Line was created as a system of long-term firing points, some of which were full-fledged concrete and earthen fortresses with a wide range of defensive capabilities. The Finnish press called these bunkers million, since the cost of each of them exceeded one million Finnish marks. It is likely that the emerging "Wagner Line" will also tie the bunker system into a knot. However, there is an assumption that at the turn there will not be the same bulky and expensive structures as the Finnish "millionaires"."Our country also has its own history of large defensive structures. If we compare in detail the formation of the "Wagner Line" near Lugansk, then the Soviet development will be much closer to the emerging defensive complex. First of all, we are talking about the so-called "Stalin Line", which was created in the USSR and stretched along the entire western border of the Union from Karelia to Transnistria. Unlike the Maginot Line, which in fact did not offer significant resistance to the Wehrmacht, the Stalin Line played a role in the first disruption of Operation Barbarossa."At the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet army, having retreated to the old defense lines of the Stalin Line, was able to hold back the onslaught of the German offensive for three days near Minsk, for 20 days near Polotsk and for more than two months near Kiev. As a result, the forces of the Third Reich had to change their original plans for a direct advance to Moscow and deploy tanks on the "Stalin Line", thereby partially losing the pace of the offensive. In this sense, Russian ingenuity and a prepared fortified area inflicted the first painful injection on the hitherto invincible blitzkrieg machine."However, if we opposed the Wehrmacht 80 years ago, this does not mean that we should not adopt those military developments that were introduced by the German military. In the same way that Soviet military equipment was replenished after the Great Patriotic War with German developments, the defensive fortifications near Lugansk used elements familiar to military historians from the Siegfried Line, a defensive line created in western Germany in the border strip from Kleve to Basel. In particular, from this project, the builders of fortifications near Luhansk spied on a system of several rows of concrete gouges and their precise installation at an equal distance from each other. Most likely, these gouges will be equipped with barbed wire to prevent infantry attacks, and also mined."In this sense, the "Wagner Line" combines the developments of all major defensive structures of the last century. However, choosing among various fortification systems, the Wagner PMC engineering detachments used a successful compromise near Lugansk between the Soviet designs for a relatively cheap and simple defensive line, and the German layout of the fortifications."What is the purpose of the new defensive line? And in what direction will the construction of the Wagner Line go further? Judging by the satellite images presented in the West, Wagner PMC engineering teams continue to dig in at the chosen line: the experts have come to the attention of an army vehicle for the rapid laying of ditches and trenches BTM-3. This means that the lines of trenches and trenches have not yet been dug to the end, which means that the Wagner Line will most likely stretch for several tens of kilometers, which will significantly complicate any attempts by Ukrainian militants to move towards the LPR."In addition to the distance, the most important moment in the formation of the line of defense should be the creation of concrete long-term firing points (DOT) and wood-and-earth field fortifications (DZOT), as well as dugouts for placing personnel in them. The presented pictures and frames do not yet give an idea of where and how these types of fortifications will be formed. So far, the engineering units are busy forming a support zone that will allow the fighters on the line to avoid a sudden attack by the enemy and prepare for defense properly."Another thing is important - right now, before our eyes, a full-fledged border fortified area is being created, covering the new state border of the Russian Federation, which now runs through the Luhansk People's Republic. Given the range of knowledge and experience of Wagner PMCs, there is no doubt that the new frontier will take a hit from the Kyiv formations and ensure peaceful life in the Donbass."The Wagner Group published a map of the future defense line. According to it, the fortifications were to stretch for more than 200 km deep into the rear of the occupied territories in the east of Ukraine: from Svitlodarsk to almost Kreminna, then through Lysychansk and then along the southern bank of the Siversky Donets and the border with the Russian Federation. Beyond the defense line, Prigozhin left captured Novoaidar, Severodonetsk, Kreminna, and Horlivka. Thus, this line separates the nominal northern part of the Luhansk region from the southern part.Yhe UK Ministry of Defence reported 23 October 2022 "(3/5) Imagery showed a section of newly constructed anti-tank defences and trench systems southeast of Kreminna in Luhansk Oblast. If the plans are as extensive as Prigozhin claims, the works likely aim to integrate the Siversky Donetsk river into the defensive zone, partially following the 2015 Line of Control. The project suggests Russia is making a significant effort to prepare defences in depth behind the current front line, likely to deter any rapid Ukrainian counter offensives."Such fortifications are built not only in the Russian-occupied territories but in the Belgorod Oblast of Russia, too. One of the militants of the PMC "Wagner" Andrey Bogatov told this to russian TV. unlike in the Luhansk region where the "wagnerovites" installed two rows of anti-tank concrete blocks and made an anti-tank ditch, in the Belgorod Oblast they only put some pyramids.The head of the Luhansk Regional Military Administration, Sergii Haidai, reported that the Russians continue to build the Wagner Line near Hirske. In addition, he said that the occupiers are recruiting people through advertisem*nts on poles to build the line, in particular bulldozers, manipulator drivers, excavator drivers, and heavy equipment drivers.Russian soldiers from the "Private Military Company of Wagner" are building their defense line in the occupied part of the Luhansk region in order to deter any quick counteroffensives of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This was reported by British military intelligence on 23 October 2022. The photos show an area of recently constructed anti-tank fortifications and trench systems southeast of Kreminnaya in the Luhansk region. If the plans are as big as Prigozhin claims, then the work will most likely be aimed at integrating the Siverskyi Donets River into the defense zone.On 23 October 2022 Military expert Oleg Zhdanov spoke about this on FREEDOM. Now is the rainy season, and all the trenches that will come off today, without further engineering equipment, will all turn into a swamp. Their edges will crumble, water will be collected in these trenches. So far, this is the primary preparation of the defense line, Zhdanov said. How far the Russians will be able to occupy and hold it is a huge question.According to satellite imagery by Maxar Technologies, the "Wagner Line" near the village of Gorskoye in the Donetsk region reaches only about 2 km, but Russia says it plans to "strengthen" 217 km in this way. And to move them, there are a lot of ways - starting with the help of artillery and ending with engineering vehicles for obstacles or trawls that are installed on tanks, Zhdanov explained.What they are doing in Belgorod is a little different. This is not a line of defense. We need some kind of firing points, strongholds of defense areas. It's not just a tractor came, dug, and left. Two rains passed - and everything was washed away. It is necessary to build up everything, prepare flooring, make the lining of trenches, pillboxes, and dugouts, bring material and technical equipment there, make ammunition depots, food stores, and so on," he said. So for the time being, this is a PR campaign aimed at intimidating citizens so that they do not speak out strongly, Zhdanov summed up.
Germany's East Wall in World War IIAuthor: Neil Shorthttps://bunkry24.pl/">Boryszyn Loop in the MiÄdzyrzecz Fortified Region (MRU)http://www.ostwallinfo.de/index.htm?/oder_warthe_bogen.htmhttps://www.landmarkscout.com/the-ostwall-oder-warthe-bogen-werkgruppe-scharnhorst-pniewo-poland/https://www.jstor.org/stable/26013909">The Phantom Barrier: "Ostwallbau" 1944â1945Alastair NobleWar in HistoryVol. 8, No. 4 (November 2001), pp. 442-467 https://www.bunkersite.com/locations/poland/ostwall/oderwarte.phphttps://ostwall-reisen.de/http://www.ostwall.pl/
The "Ostwall" (Oder-Warthe-Bogen) is quite forgotten, there are many reasons for this. Technically, there are at least 3 construction projects of the Second World War that are referred to with "Ostwall". These defense lines were meant to halt an invasion from the East and this is why the defense lines are better known as the âOstwallâ or âEast Wallâ. Ostwall is an all-embracing label for the defences constructed or strengthened in eastern Germany during the final months of the Second World War.
The East Wall was where the final battles for the stricken Third Reich were fought, amid scenes of utter carnage. Beginning life at the end of World War I, the wall became a pet project of Adolf Hitler's, whose ascent to power saw building work accelerated, with plans for a grand, 'Maginot-style' defence put in place. The correct name is "Fortress in the Oder-Warthe-Bogen", in Polish "MiÄdzyrzecki Rejon Umocniony" or "MRU" for short.
Other than their failure to halt the Red Army in 1945 little is known about the fortifications. Key background issues such as the scale of the enterprise, the composition of the labor force and the factors governing the construction process have hitherto remained unexplored. Militarily, the Ostwall was unsuccessful but it had considerable significance in determining public mood and highlighted the extent of Party power during the final period of the Third Reich.
Already in the years after 1920, the first defense points were created along the new Reich border, which was created after 1918, towards Poland, which was newly founded in 1918. Especially after the war between Poland and Russia in 1920 and the resulting victory of the Poles , the German army command was alarmed by the Polish military strength. Hampered by the Versailles Treaty ( 100,000 troops rule ), the idea of ââa line of defense along the new eastern frontier arose.
Already planned by the Reichswehr in the 1920s, more than 300 bunkers and facilities such as fortress bridges or dams and flood works were to be built on a front length of approx. 90 kilometers. However, since the Versailles Treaty prohibited the construction of new fortresses on the national borders, the construction of the "Ostwall" only began in 1935, after Adolf Hitler's personal approval.
The plans and tactics of OWB are very much inspired by the Maginot Line in France, which was seen as an example of modern fortification during that time. Typical for these fortifications or in German âPanzerwerkeâ (Pz.W) of the central section of OWB is that they are all (21) interconnected by a 30 km long underground tunnel system called âHohlgangsystemâ of which around 20 km was fitted with small tracks for the use of electric trains for fast transportation of men and equipment.
When the Nazis built the imposting Ostwall Fortification in the mid-1930s the intention was to create a defense against invading Russian force. The Ostwall Fortification, otherwise known as the tongue twisting âFestungsfront Oder-Warthe-Bogen,â was constructed as a massive self-sufficient bunker defense system that was connected by almost 25 miles of tunnels and underground support chambers. The underground complex connected around a hundred pillbox bunkers creating one of the largest and most extensive defense lines Nazi Germany ever created. The anti-tank barrier is integrated into the dragon's teeth and is a 16 km long barrier in one piece in the OWB. It was estimated that at full capacity and operation the system could house 24,000 soldiers comfortably. The bunker system was seen as a bit of a revolutionary endeavor at the time, both in terms of efficiency and efficacy.
The Ostwall consists of an approximately 100 km long and 2 km wide strip that stretches in a north-south direction between the rivers Oder and Warthe. In the northern and southern part, the fortifications are formed by isolated bunkers, referred to here as armored works, combined with natural terrain elements such as lakes. In the central section, the bunkers are very densely arranged and mostly connected underground by a system of tunnels.
The underground system not only connects the bunkers with each other, but also contains other facilities such as barracks, train stations, workshops, machine rooms and ammunition stores, making it the most interesting part of the fortress in the Oder-Warthe-Bogen.
The East Prussian positions were built to prevent the possibility of a renewed incursion into German Reich territory. By integrating the Masurian chain of lakes, several chains of bunkers were built around East Prussia on the east side. In preparation for the construction of the Führer headquarters Askania 1 to 3 for the Barbarossa case (attack on Russia), the location of the East Prussian defense was included in the planning for securing FHQ Askania 1. It was precisely this additional protection that led to FHQ Askania 1 becoming FHQ Wolfsschanzewould.
But with a characteristically erratic change of heart, Hitler began to systematically strip the wall of its best defensive assets to bolster the Atlantic Wall, never dreaming that he would face an attack on two fronts. The construction period should be 15 years. The work was stopped after 3 years because the war against Poland had been decided in the meantime and the capacities for the construction of the west wall were needed.
Despite belated and somewhat bungled reinforcements later in the War, the East Wall would face a monstrous challenge as it became the Reich's last redoubt in the face of the mighty Soviet war machine. The different stages of the wall's construction included years of neglect and decay and the hasty, drastic redevelopment in the face of the looming Soviet threat.
When the attack on the base actually came, there were just 1,000 soldiers manning the massive defense. The Nazi's impressive defensive juggernaut fell in just three days. Now the Ostwall has been rediscovered as an interesting destination for an excursion. In the town of Pniewo, the completely renovated Panzerwerk 717, which is largely equipped with original equipment , can be visited. From April to September, the Polish nature conservation authority also allows descending into the underground facilities of the highly interesting Armored Battery 5, also known as the Burschen loop .
'Ostwall', the PantherâWotan line, was also the German alternative designation for that part of the 'Panther-Wotan-Stellung' on the Eastern Front in the area of Sozh, the Dniepr river and Bryansk (June 1943). After the defeat at Stalingrad and the Battle of Kursk, the army of the Third Reich retreated rapidly to the territory of Ukraine, reaching the western bank of the Dnieper. Hitler harbored plans to turn the broad and tempestuous river into part of the so-called Ostwall (âEastern Wallâ), which would separate Germany from the âred hordesâ and give the Wehrmacht a chance to muster up strength for a new offensive. âThe Dnieper is impassable!â German generals reassured their troops. âPillage, burn and hang them high!â urged the SS. Ukraine groans, engulfed in blood and fire. Red Army troops rushed to the rescue. On homemade pontoons, flimsy rafts, and fishing boats, under a barrage of machine-gun and mortar fire, Soviet soldiers crossed the great Dnieper.
https://regiowiki.at/wiki/S%C3%BCdostwall-Abschnitt_S%C3%BCdburgenland">Sudostwall-Abschnitt Sudburgenlandhttp://www.geheimprojekte.at/info_suedostwall.html">Die "Reichsschutzstellung" - "Sudostwall"South-east wall (Sudostwall) Reichsschutzstellung
The South-east wall (German: Sudostwall) (also known as Reichsschutzstellung = Reich protection position) was a system of fortifications planned by Nazi Germany in the late stages of World War II to extend along the Little Carpathians and Lake Neusiedl southwards to the River Drau. Not a wall in the true sense of the word, the South-east wall was rather a series of German batteries and anti-tank ditches built at strategic locations alongside the southeastern border of the German Reich in 1944/45 with the intention of stoping the Red Army.
The defeat of the German 6th Army in Stalingrad in early 1943 prompted the German leadership to take measures to secure the border of the German Reich. Several variants of the course of the position were discussed. Finally, the line Pressburg - Parndorf - Mörbisch - Sopron (Ãdenburg) - Deutschkreuz - Nikitsch was established. Reichsschutzstellung (south-east wall), line of defense which, from the autumn of 1944, was to extend from Pressburg (Bratislava) via Weiden on the northern edge of Lake Neusiedl, Ãdenburg and Gewrittenstein to Lower Styria. Behind it was a second line from Bruck an der Leitha via Neusiedl, Mannersdorf and Siegendorf, Schattendorf and Neckenmarkt.
The defense system consisted of two lines, the A and B lines, a few kilometers apart. They consisted of anti-tank ditches, positions, minefields, anti-tank humps, etc. Various combat shelters and positions for artillery were built into the defense systems . Shelters against grenade launcher fireshould protect, were mostly made of wood. Only in the Rechnitz area was concrete used in bunker construction.
Aerial photographs from December 1944 already show that the anti-tank ditch of the B line in the Eisenstadt area had already been completed. These anti-tank ditches were mostly unpaved and about three meters deep. This meant that the ditches fell into disrepair very soon. Attempts were made to eliminate this problem by using various wooden attachments.
The Reich Labor Service, "Todt Organization", foreign civilian workers, prisoners of war, forced labourers, Hungarian Jews and the Volkssturm were used to build them (in January 1945 a total of 83,000 people). To speed up the construction work, up to 80,000 people were deployed, including numerous concentration camp prisoners who were housed in their own prison camps (e.g. Siegendorf prison camp ). Despite the enormous deployment of workers who had to work without machines and mostly under inhumane conditions, the Reichsschutzstellung was only an improvised position system.
Despite the enormous effort, the importance of the fortifications remained very low. On long stretches, the systems were only incompletely or not at all completed. There were also hardly any soldiers left for defense. . At the end of 1944, the so-called Volkssturm battalions were set up as the last contingent. These consisted mainly of old men who were very poorly trained and armed. The Volkssturm was not enough to stop the Red Army. The Reichsschutz position in March and April 1945 proved ineffective against the advancing Soviet troops. The defensive line was only partly finished when the Red Army reached the line in March 1945, and merely slowed the speed of their offensive.
After the failure of the Lake Balaton offensive, the defeated formations of the German 6th Army retreated to the Reichsschutz position, under pressure and in some cases already outflanked by armored formations of the Red Army. From March 29 to April 11, 1945, bloody fighting developed along parts of this position system before it was finally abandoned by the German troops. The Red Army broke through the line at the beginning of the Vienna Offensive. Vienna is located only 35 kilometers (22 mi) west of the defensive line.
Compared to defensive positions such as the West Wall or the French Maginot Line , which had been built in peacetime at great financial and material expense, the so-called Southeast Wall had no military significance. Its value as a defensive position, on the other hand, was wildly exaggerated by German propaganda, probably in order to calm down and satisfy the population as well as the political incumbents.
https://web.archive.org/web/20071012204958/http://utenti.lycos.it/valloalpinoit/">LA LINEA FORTIFICATA DELLE ALPI: IL VALLO ALPINO
Mussolini's Alpine Wall (Italian: Vallo Alpino), a massive system of mountain strongholds constructed over nearly 20 years along the northern borders of Italy in the Alps region, spanning approximately 2,000 kilometers. However, the Alpine Wall proved ineffective. The Alpine Wall was a complex system of fortifications constructed by Italy in the years leading up to World War II, along the country's borders with France, Switzerland, Austria, and Yugoslavia. This series of defensive structures stretched over 1,800 kilometers (1,100 miles) from the Mediterranean coast to the Yugoslavian border, spanning across the entirety of the Italian Alps.
Up until the beginning of the 1930s, the supervision and defense of the Alpine border were entrusted to the Royal Guardia di Finanza, the Royal Carabinieri, the Border Militia and Alpine troops, who were also given the task of supervising the new defensive works of the permanent fortification, then in progress of design and/or construction along the Italian mountain border, from Ventimiglia to Istria.
These new attributions were in contrast with the employment doctrines of that time which provided for the use of the Great Alpine Units wherever the need required it, being the same troops suitable for carrying out actions of a dynamic nature and not militias destined for the defense of points fixed, therefore the Higher Command of the Alpine Troops pointed out to the General Staff of the Royal Army (SMRE) the inconsistency of an attitude which required essentially mobile units to provide - in fact - a static service.
After the end of the First World War and for more than a decade, the fortification activity of the borders of the Kingdom of Italy almost completely stopped. The armored batteries had given disappointing results and in the test of fire they had proved too vulnerable to Austro-Hungarian siege artillery. The tragedy of Fort Verena in June 1915, where 49 artillerymen were killed by a shot from an Austrian 305 that had broken through the concrete vault of the battery, convinced the General Staff of the opportunity to completely change the structural concepts of the border defensive positions.
No longer large parallelepipeds of concrete with armored domes (fortresses mod. Rocchi), but emplacements completely obtained inside the rock: tunnels, reserves, logistics rooms, dormitories for the personnel, communicating with the weapon emplacements and the observers, which , together with the entrances to the work, were the only structures placed outside. These could be simple loopholes in the rock, or large concrete loot protected by steel plates or domes. Thus it was that the valleys were once again crossed by hundreds of civil and military engineering workers, intent on tracing new connecting routes and fortifying every single border crossing. The pharaonic project foresaw three successive defensive lines; the chronic budgetary and raw material problems, especially steel, drastically reduced the initial project.
After innumerable studies it was born in 1934, officially established with Royal Decree Law n. 833 of 28 April 1937, a special body which had the task of permanently supervising the fortified line of the entire Italian border, called "Guardia alla Frontiera" (GaF), including infantry, artillery, engineering and services departments. In the same year, the Army Chief of Staff ordered the transformation of five army artillery regiments into GaF artillery regiments.
The corps was assigned all the logistic-administrative components indispensable for carrying out the assigned tasks. At the time of mobilisation, the establishment of companies and battalions of positional machine gunners was envisaged, which had the task of defending the stretches of border without permanent fortifications or not covered by the weapons of the works.
The backbone of the GaF was given by the Border Guard Command, at each Army Command competent for the territory, by the "Sectors" (27 Covering Sectors, numbers from I° to XXVII° each of which was entrusted with a stretch of border, sectors XVIII - XIX - XX were expected to be established in fact never occurred) which included "Sub-sectors", "Groups of cornerstones" and minor units. Two or more sub-sectors depended on the sector commands (with fortified works manned by infantry units, artillery and engineering departments, sectoral artillery of various calibres, engineering departments, service departments. Some GaF commands directly depended regiments and/or GAF artillery groupings ordered so as to be able to quickly integrate the artillery of the "Sectors".
The GaF artillery units. was divided into: "Always Ready" groups normally assigned to the Coverage Sectors, "Accelerated Preparation" groups and "Normal Preparation" groups. The effort to "hermetically" close the border was enormous, taking into account the difficulties in supplying materials due to the sanctions, the situation in May 1939, therefore one year before the war, can be summarized as follows: Western Scacchiere: 460 works already efficient with 1,100 machine guns and 133 pieces of various calibers (cave batteries and anti-tank pieces), as much armament had to be distributed during the year for the new works to be built; during the year, 300 machine guns, 280 mortars, 58 batteries were assigned, some of which were large-caliber and long-range, suitable for interdiction shots on the main confluence centers or obligatory passage points. Northern Scacchiere : 161 works already efficient with 336 machine guns and 39 pieces; the delivery in the second semester of 50 machine guns, 108 killed, 31 batteries of various calibres was foreseen; Eastern Scacchiere: 308 works already efficient with 647 machine guns and 50 pieces, 564 machine guns, 114 mortars, 49 batteries of various calibers were being set up and delivered.
At the beginning of the conflict, June 1940, the GaF had a total of twenty thousand men, a thousand works, six thousand machine guns, four hundred and sixty-two mortars of various types, two hundred and twenty-two cannons of various calibers in the works, one hundred and thirty-eight batteries of various calibers, equipped with artillery left over from the I ° GM or war booty.
The recruitment of personnel, in order not to affect that destined for the Alpine troops, took place in any Military District, it being understood that the military had to possess psycho-health profiles identical to the Alpine troops. The circular of the Ministry of War 18.559 dated 6 September 1934 appears singular, which excluded from assignment to the frontier corps the non-global soldiers belonging to the Military Districts of Trieste, Pola, Gorizia, Bolzano, Udine, and Ancona, probably this provision had the purpose of take precautions against possible espionage actions towards neighboring countries.A typical alpine training was imposed on the soldiers of the GAF with marches on rough terrain, use of skiing, rock climbing and a life reduced to the essentials, conditioned by the particular environment (the fortified work), and accustomed to the idea of ??living permanently in the mountains, often not in the best conditions, an example for all: the 515th btr. GAF the department presided over the fort Chaberton, in the Monginevro sector, at 3,130 meters above sea level. From the barracks and/or barracks, built a short distance from the border, and thanks to an excellent road network already in place, they could quickly reach and supply all the defensive installations at high altitude.
The primary purpose of the Alpine Wall was to protect Italy from potential invasions, especially from France and Germany. The Wall included thousands of bunkers, artillery posts, and fortifications built into the mountainous terrain. At the outbreak of war with France in June 1940, only the front line was nearly complete. The entire Alpine arc from Ventimiglia to the border with Yugoslavia was divided into nineteen sectors of the Guardia alla Frontiera, identified by progressive Roman numerals; to garrison this defensive line were military posts of the three armies: "Infantry, Artillery and Engineers", framed in the new body of the Guard at the Frontier, whose motto, coined by the Prince of Piedmont Umberto II was: " especially steel, drastically reduced the initial project.
The Alpine Wall's effectiveness was never truly tested, as the main fighting in Italy during World War II took place after the Italian surrender, with the major Axis and Allies battles occurring further south.
With the restructuring of the Italian Army, after the war, the Frontier Guard Corps was not reconstituted, the garrison of the works of the Alpine Wall and those of new construction for the defense of the eastern border, was initially entrusted to the Frontier Groups and subsequently to the Alpini and Arrest Infantry battalions which have every right to boast of being the natural heirs of that Military Corps which in its brief existence was able to silently fulfill its duty, often paying a high blood toll.
The geopolitical situation that arose after the war led to the partial restoration and putting into operation of the works of the former Northern Alpine Wall, which were operational again from the beginning of the 1950s until 1992 , manned by departments specifically dedicated to the purpose: Alpini d' arrest and arresters. After the war, many of these fortifications were abandoned and are now decaying, though some remain as historical sites. The Alpine Wall is not regularly maintained and its conditions may vary greatly from one site to another. Some of the bunkers and fortifications can still be visited by tourists and are considered important historical landmarks.
https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/atlantic-wall-3-9781472811462/">The Atlantic Wall (3) The Sudwall Steven J. Zaloga (Author), Adam Hook (Illustrator)https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09528822.2018.1562681?journalCode=ctte20">Südwall, Marseille, 20172018https://www.bunkersite.com/locations/france/sudwall/sudwall.phphttps://www.tracesofwar.com/themes/4662/S%C3%BCdwall.htmhttps://stahlbeton.nl/mittelmeerkustenfront/https://www.relikte.info/sudwall.html7
The Südwall, "rampart of the south", was an extensive system of coastal fortifications, built by the Third Reich during the Second World War (1943) along the French coast of the Mediterranean Sea (Mittelmeerküstenfront) (from Cerbère to Menton) and intended to prevent an invasion by the Allies.During the Second World War Germany established its southern front or Südwall, running from the Spanish to the Italian borders and following the Marseille coastline, as a defensive line. The defenses served the Wehrmacht, who occupied the area from 1943, and to this day remnants of the military bunkers and forts can be seen in Marseille, on the white rocky coast of the Calanques and on surrounding islands, such as the Îles du Frioul. Unlike the Atlantic bunkers in Brittany and Normandy, the history of the Südwall is not well known.
After the alarming collapse of Italy in 1943, the Germans launched a crash building program and the 'Sudwall,' (South Wall) sprang up quickly along the French Mediterranean coast and the neighbouring Italian coast around Genoa. The new defences were bolstered by existing French fortifications of key port towns such as Marseilles and Toulon - many of them bristling with heavy artillery.
The 19th German Army (AOK 19, whose CP was in Avignon) was composed of 7 coastal defense sectors (KüstenVerteidigungsAbschnitt; KVA) covering the 864 km of the French Mediterranean coast from the Spanish border to the Italian border. The AOK 19 includes the following KVA: 19 KVA A / 271. ID: Port-Vendres, Collioure, Cap Leucate 19 KVA B / 277. ID: Port-la-Nouvelle, Narbonne-Plage 19 KVA C / 271. ID: Cap d'Agde, Sète 19 KVA D / 338. ID: La Camargue 19 KVA E / 244. ID: Marseille 19 KVA F / 242. ID: Toulon 19 KVA G / 148. ID: Cannes, Nice Au
At the time of the landing in Provence, the coastal rampart was made up of approximately 500 usable structures and 200 structures under construction. the coast during the war was devided in a German and Italian part. The German sector took part in the construction programs, the Italians did not. Only in the end of 1943 the Germans had gained full control over the entire French Mediterranean coast, and increased their building capacity from that point on. Even though the efforts increased, the important armored turrets and other steel parts for the bunkers remained unavailable for this region, and the majority of the fortifications remained constructed in a lighter degree.
Because of this and other reasons the Mediterranean coastal front was not shaped in the way that its counterpart was on the other side of France. Despite the difference between both coastal regions, the Südwall as some call it, is still very interesting to visit. From the Spanish border up to the border with Italy the coast was scattered with fortifications; we highlight the use tank-turrets on many positions which seemed to be quite common in this region.
Furthermore the Marseille area, which was a Defensive Area, is a highlight because of its role as a major port during the War. From the harbour submarines controlled the Mediterranean, the massive bunker build here to protect the so called U-boats, still remains. At Istres a big airfield was build with the role as Fliegerhorst, erected with all the necessary to house heavy bombers and fighter aircrafts.
In general the Südwall can be highlighted as being fortified with camouflage, using the dry and rocky looks to let the bunkers blend in with the landscape.
The Allied invasion of southern France in the late summer of 1944, an operation first code-named ANVIL and later DRAGOON, marked the beginning of one of the most successful but controversial campaigns of World War II. However, because it fell both geographically and chronologically between two much larger Allied efforts in northern France and Italy, both its conduct and its contributions have been largely ignored. Planned originally as a simultaneous complement to OVERLORD, the cross-Channel attack on Normandy, ANVIL actually took place over two months later, on 15 August 1944, making it appear almost an afterthought to the main Allied offensive in northern Europe. Opponents of ANVIL, including British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, have long argued that the invasion of southern France did little more than sap the strength of the main Allied campaign in the Mediterranean, the drive north up the Italian peninsula toward Austria and Hungary. This direct thrust through the so-called soft underbelly of German-dominated Europe might also, in retrospect, have altered the East-West balance of postwar Europe. In contrast, defenders of ANVIL, mainly Americans, have steadfastly maintained that even if the rugged Italian campaign could have been accelerated, the operational and logistical difficulties of rapidly crossing the Julian Alps would have been impossible to overcome. Far more significant to the Allied cause in Europe was the capture of Marseille, France's largest port, and the rapid rehabilitation of the Rhone valley rail and road network. Until the opening of Antwerp in December 1944, this supply route was to satisfy over one-third of the Allied logistical needs in northern France.
The selection of the actual landing site was less complex. After rejecting a direct assault on the major ports whose seaward fortifications appeared formidable, Allied planners finally chose the St. Tropez area some 30 miles east of Toulon. The proposed beachhead included about 30 miles of coastline (and 50 miles of shoreline) and swung inland to a depth of 20 miles, encompassing the Maures and Esterel hill masses. The region contained several excellent strands for landing operations and good exits into the interior and an early seizure of the hills would provide adequate security for the ensuing troop and supply buildup.
On the German side the attack came as no surprise. Luftwaffe air reconnaissance had chronicled the Allied naval buildup for General Friedrich Wiese, commanding the defending Nineteenth Army in southern France. But neither he nor his superior, General Johannes Blaskowitz, heading Army Group G. could determine the precise landing area, nor had they the forces to defend the entire coastline adequately. Blaskowitz also had to maintain strong forces in western France, to defend the Atlantic coast, and since the Normandy invasion in early June, he had seen many of his best reserve units transferred north. Finally, German naval and air power in southern France was extremely weak, and steadily increasing guerrilla attacks by the French Resistance continued to hamper German lines of communication.
Nevertheless, the German leaders did what they could to prepare for the assault. Wiese, the Nineteenth Army commander, heavily fortified the areas around Marseille and Toulon and put his troops on almost constant alert. His three corps headquarters and seven infantry divisions, although understrength and underequipped, were rested and led by veteran officers and NCOs. In army group reserve were the 11th Panzer Division, at almost full strength, and a mountain division, the former still west of the Rhone near Toulouse and the latter based at Grenoble.
Daybreak on 15 August revealed a clear Mediterranean morning with the autumn storms, the French mistral, still weeks away. The German High Command began to reevaluate its entire position in the west. By 16 August the failure of the German counterattack at Mortain in northern France had confirmed the Allies' breakout at St. Lo from their Normandy beachhead. And with many of their divisions in danger of annihilation in the Falaise Pocket, the German leaders finally elected to order a general withdrawal from France. Instructions went out from Berlin that day ordering Blaskowitz to begin moving his Atlantic coast forces to the east, out of western France, and his Mediterranean forces to the north, up the Rhone River valley.
The Allied commanders were clearly assisted by the ULTRA intercept program, which revealed the details of the German withdrawal, a rare intelligence coup. In sum, the Southern France Campaign showed what experienced, well-led Allied troops could do against their German foes. None wanted a repeat of the Italian campaign, the long slugging match on Guadalcanal, or the two-month stalemate in Normandy. French officers were equally eager to get on with the liberation of their homeland. All were willing to take risks to shorten the campaign, and each was confident that his troops and commanders could carry out even the most difficult maneuvers. It was in this respect that the campaign for southern France, one which resulted in the presence on Eisenhower's southern flank of a strong Allied army group rather than a hostile German one, differed markedly from many other Allied efforts and deserves more study and attention than it has yet received.
https://www.nationalgeographic.si/rupnikova-crta/">Rupnikova linijahttps://www.researchgate.net/publication/330479306_Sectoral_Division_of_Rapallo_Border_Defence_Systems_and_Discovering_the_Extent_of_the_Rupnik_Line_Fortification_System">Sectoral Division of Rapallo Border Defence Systems and Discovering the Extent of the Rupnik Line Fortification Systemhttps://www.tracesofwar.com/themes/4757/Rupnik-Line.htm">Rupnikova linijaGround mines , a combat weapon (special ammunition) designed to destroy enemy manpower and equipment , as well as to destroy roads and various structures in order to slow down the rate of advance and make it difficult to maneuver his troops (see Military obstacles , Mine - explosive barriers). A mine consists of an explosive charge, a drive (reacting) device, a fuse and a housing (metal, wood, plastic, etc.). Some types of mines may be unframed. For the safe installation of mines and the difficulty of their reconnaissance and demining by the enemy, additional devices (fuses, elements that make it difficult to extract, self-liquidators, etc.) can be used in mine designs. The use of mines in the form of field minesknown from ancient times. With the advent of high explosives, the invention by Russian engineers of electrical (P. L. Schilling, 1812) and chemical (S. P. Vlasov, 1815) methods of blasting M. n. received further development. During the defense of Sevastopol (185455), Russian troops successfully used stone-throwing landmines, which were exploded electrically. In the Russo-Turkish War of 187778, self-explosive landmines (prototypes of modern anti-personnel mines) were widely used, and in the defense of Port Arthur, shrapnel jumping-out anti-personnel mines designed by Karasev were used. In World War I (191418), M. n. were in service with the armies of all warring states. Russian military engineers Dragomirov, Revensky, Salyaev proposed designs for anti-tank mines during the war.Karbyshev . In the 2nd World War 1939-1945 M. n. used on a massive scale. The total number of mines laid by the belligerents on the Soviet-German front alone exceeded 200 million. Depending on the design of the drive device M. n. there are contact ones that explode from direct action (pressing, pulling) on ??their drive device of a tank, machine, person, and non-contact ones that explode from impact on the drive device of vibration, changes in the strength of the Earth's magnetic field, etc. Distinguish between unguided and controlled mines. Unguided mines explode automatically from the impact of the target on the drive device and the fuse (the mine must first be put in a combat position). Guided mines or minefields are detonated from the command post by wire, radio, or at a predetermined time using mechanical devices. By purpose, mines are distinguished: anti-tank, anti-personnel, anti-vehicle, object and special. In the armed forces of the United States, France, Germany and some others for the mechanized installation of mines have special spreaders (layers). Some types of mines can be installed with the help of aviation, artillery rocket systems. Anti-tank mines are anti-track, anti-bottom and anti-aircraft. Some types of mines have a charge, the explosion of which ensures the interruption of a tank caterpillar or piercing its bottom. In World War II, anti-track mines with a charge of 3-10 kg were mainly used. Anti-personnel mines strike the enemys manpower with a shock wave (high-explosive mines) or pre-prepared fragments flying from the mine body in the form of balls, cylinders, arrows, or fragments formed due to crushing of the body (fragmentation mines). A high-explosive mine charge contains 30-200 g, and a fragmentation mine from 75 g to 5 kg of explosive. The fuses are mainly used for push and pull action, they can also be combined. Artillery shells adapted for detonation are sometimes used as anti-personnel mines. Anti-personnel mines are also used for the device of "mines-surprises", "boom-traps". Anti-vehicle mines are intended for mining roads and railways, airfields. The charge of a mine can be designed not only to destroy a vehicle, but also to destroy a road. Mines are set into a combat position after a certain (specified) time, and explode from the impact on its reacting organ of passing vehicles. Object mines are intended for the destruction of bridges, tunnels and other structures. They are installed inside the destructible object in special mine wells (chambers) or in the ground.But in general, in the conditions of modern warfare, the anti-tank ditch cannot be considered a serious anti-tank obstacle. In the tank regiment of the Russian Army, to overcome such obstacles, there are three bridge layers of the MTU, MTU-20, MT-55, MTU-72 types, plus four spans of the TMM mechanized bridge. There are seven bridges in total. In addition, three tanks in each tank battalion have mounted tank bulldozers (a total of 9 BTU bulldozers). Plus, the sapper company has a BAT-M or BAT-2 tracklayer. With such means, the moat for the regiment is not a hindrance. in the Donetsk region, anti-tank ditches were fenced off from Russia along the entire land part of the Ukrainian-Russian border in the territory of the Donetsk region - this is about 180 km "in case of possible illegal actions."Trenches are being dug from the Sea of ??Azov to the border with the Lugansk region (there are such settlements as Novoazovsk, Uspenka, etc.). Here appeared ditches with a depth of about 2-3 meters, a width of 4 meters with bulk shafts from 1.5 to 2 meters. It is these trenches that, according to the chairman of the Donetsk Regional State Administration Serhiy Taruta, should stop vehicles from crossing the Ukrainian border.My brother and I dug a ditch, four meters wide, along the entire section of the border at our own expense over the weekend . Thus, any transport or equipment can now enter the region only through checkpoints , said the millionaire .Anti-tank ditches, perhaps the most famous among Muscovites and Leningraders of the now passing generation, anti-tank barrier of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) In late summer - early autumn of 1941, tens of thousands of citizens dug these ditches. Millions of cubic meters of soil have been excavated, millions of man-hours have been spent on these generally useless structures.The fact is that the laboriousness of extracting 100 meters of an anti-tank ditch is about 20-25 machine hours of an excavator. If translated into manual labor, then 125 man-days of skilled diggers are required per 100 meters of ditch. If you arrange a ditch in an explosive way, then 40-50 man-hours and 2-3 machine hours of an excavator plus 1200-1600 kg are required per 100 meters of the ditch. TNT.And at the same time, the device for crossing the ditch requires from 3 minutes (tank bridge layer), up to 5 man-hours of labor of excavators. In an explosive way, the transition is arranged in 30-40 minutes.The history of the war quite convincingly showed that the construction of multi-kilometer anti-tank ditches, with enormous labor costs, does not provide any serious delay to enemy tanks. The anti-tank ditch itself and its passage cannot be hidden from the enemy, and therefore, in his combat plans, he will take into account the presence of a ditch and take appropriate measures.And yet, this type of anti-tank obstacle should not be completely discounted. It can play some role in favorable conditions. For example, with the help of a moat 100-200 meters long, it is possible to close the gap between the swamp and the river. Under the anti-tank ditch, you can equip a ravine, a stream or a river with steep banks, a canal.http://xn--90aalbfjhggvbi7ak8a.xn--p1ai/index.php/opisanie-memoriala-lobnenskij-rubezh-1941-god/protivotankovyj-rovThe depth of the ditch should be at least 2 meters, the width should be at least 5 meters. The wall facing the enemy should have a slope of 45-60 degrees, and the opposite 60-65 degrees. It is impractical to make steeper walls, because the earth from steep slopes will crumble, making it easier for the enemy to overcome the ditch. The height of the parapets should not exceed 0.5 meters and the edges of the parapets facing the field should be gently sloping about 7 meters wide. Such breeches mask the moat to some extent when observing the terrain from the level of the driver's observation devices. The edges of parapets facing the moat should be steep, and the floor parapet should be at least 1.5 meters from the edge of the moat, but not more than 2 meters. These one and a half to two meters, as it were, widen the moat. The fact is that when you try to jump over the moat, the separation of the tank tracks from the ground will not occur from the edge of the ditch, but from a distance of 1.5-2 meters to the edge of the ditch. The berm of the opposite parapet is made about 40-50 cm wide. This is dictated by the fact that the soil from the parapet does not crumble into the ditch.The Soviets built a defensive line around Gorky in 1941. According to the Barbarossa plan, Hitler's army was to enter the city immediately after the capture of Moscow. An anti-tank ditch 1,134 kilometers long was built on the distant approaches. Then raised 12 million cubic meters of land. For comparison, during the construction of the White Sea-Baltic Canal, there were 20 million cubic meters. Moreover, the canal was dug out in 20 months, and the boundary in just 2 months.????????: https://vestinn.ru/news/society/39694/Near Yelnya, the Germans crossed the ditch on the move along the railway embankment. It was not dug up because the trains were running, during the breakthrough the Germans did not have time to call. The cyclopean structure "anti-tank ditch near Timoshevka" (from Zaporozhye to the Sea of Azov) did not play a role and could not play it. the Germans had no tanks in that direction. During the defense of the Letichevsky UR, the ditch turned out to be even harmful - German assault groups accumulated in it before being thrown at pillboxes.In April 2014 separatists in the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk seized government buildings and established self-proclaimed peoples republics, a status not recognized by any UN member except for Russia. Clashes between government and separatist forces resulted in heavy casualties on both sides.Russian fortifications in Ukraine are the most extensive defensive works in Europe since the Great Patriotic War, Donetsk residents helped to build a second line of defense and really hope that the trenches will not come in handy. Sisyphean labor, even if the action and the trenches are not useful. This is probably the most tedious and labor-intensive work. But without trenches - there is no way. Victory is impossible without the support of the army by the civilian population. And when a request appeared on the Internet to help dig trenches for the second line of defense, the people responded. A little, but nonetheless. The trip can be said to be all-inclusive - a subbotnik in the trenches. Transfer to the place, unlimited water, shovels for every taste, buffet lunch from local residents plus compote, plus natural spa - tanning and fitness. Remembering the Great Patriotic - the trench should be deep. During the Great Patriotic War near Leningrad, General Govorov, who took command of a group of troops that directly defended the city, the first thing he did was ordered to increase the depth of the trenches so that it was possible to walk at full height. I personally went and checked that it was possible to walk from the command post to any sector of the front without bending. This measure immediately significantly reduced losses.The working place of one shooter in a trench is 150 centimeters of a trench. Mandatory step for shooting and a niche for ammunition. The land that is thrown from above is also needed. Additional protection and all this is called the parapet of the trench. The parapet of the trench should be located 20-30 centimeters from the trench itself. That is, around the trench should be a flat area with a width of 20-30 centimeters. Do not believe it - it also has a name - a trench berm, and behind it, it became immediately - a parapet.Log dugouts. The roof, as it should be since the time of the same Great Patriotic War, the dugout - three rolls. That is, three layers of logs on the roof. Why exactly three? It turns out that three layers can withstand a direct hit.Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic.According to Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) deputy chief monitor in Ukraine Alexander Hug, tthe OSCE monitoring mission had documented intensive preparations for possible renewal of violence along the conflict line. On both sides of the contact line there are accumulation of military hardware, he said August 20, 2015. We have seen also so called training camps along the contact line along both sides. Weve also seen rather robust fortification works and entrenchments on both sides os the contact line, Hug added."The one effective antidote to the increased lethality of the modern battlefield is the creation of prepared defenses. This includes multiple lines of entrenchments, the installation of covered firing positions and pillboxes and extensive use of preregistered defensive supporting artillery fire. Following the negotiation of the Minsk II ceasefire agreement, Ukraine began construction of two lines of concentric entrenchments parallel to the line of contact. This digging covers in total some 800km and is one of the most extensive efforts at fortifying a modern battlefield as has been seen since the end of the Korea war. Likewise, the Russian side is also digging in with infantry trenches and protected artillery firing positions."19 June 2015. /TASS/. Ukraines Dnepropetrovsk Region was the first to complete the construction of fortification structures on the border with Donbass (the Donetsk and Lugansk regions), the regions head Valentin Reznichenko said Friday.READ ALSODonetsk republic intelligence: Kiev brought 40 pieces of military equipment to frontline"I am grateful to all builders who completed their work. The Dnepropetrovsk Region is a reliable shield of Ukraine," Ukrainian publication Segodnya quoted Reznichenko as saying. The fortification structures 100 kilometers long consist of 27 facilities with strongholds and reinforcing obstacles, trenches and special entrenchments for hardware.Ukrainian President Pyotr Poroshenko said March 9 that Ukraine is preparing a deeply layered defense system in the countrys east. The press center of the headquarters of Kievs military operation against eastern regions specified that there are plans to create two defensive lines "to prevent the enemy from penetrating Ukrainian territory." Poroshenko said Ukraine was reinforcing the system of defense in its eastern regions. "We are building a strong, deeply echeloned system of fortification structures in the east," he said. The press centre of the military operation said it was planned to build two defensive perimeters "to prevent enemy penetration into Ukraine's territory." According to the press service, it was planned to build about 1,500 kilometres of trenches and communication trenches, more than 8,000 entrenchments for heavy weapons, more than 4,000 bunkers and a 60-kilometre-long fence of passive obstacles."The bulk of work is some 1,500 kilometers of trenches, over 8,000 entrenchments for hardware, more than 4,000 dugouts and the construction of a 60-kilometer passive obstacle," the punitive operations headquarters said. Poroshenko said the overall cost of construction of all defensive structures on the disengagement line in Donbass totals 1 billion hryvnias (about $47 million).The Ukrainian president also said all fortifications should be built by mid-July. The heads of two regions of Ukraine were even reprimanded for failure to meet the delivery date. Donetsk Region Governor Alexander Kikhtenko lost his post after the reprimand.A coup occurred in Ukraine in February 2014. Mass protests soon erupted in Ukraines southeast, where local residents did not recognize the coup-imposed authorities, formed militias and started fighting for their rights.Ukrainian troops have been engaged in fierce fighting with local militias during Kievs military operation, underway since mid-April 2014, against the breakaway territories - the Donetsk and Lugansk people's republics constituting parts of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine. The clashes have killed thousands.On September 19, 2014, the Trilateral Contact Group on settlement in east Ukraine comprising representatives of Russia, Ukraine and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) adopted a memorandum in Minsk to outline the parameters for the implementation of commitments on a ceasefire in Ukraine laid down in the 12-point Minsk Protocol of September 5, 2014.The Contact Groups meetings in December 2014 and January 2015 were nearly fruitless. The Group held regular talks in Minsk on February 10-12, 2015, signing a 13-point Package of Measures on implementation of the September 2014 Minsk agreements.The Package of Measures (Minsk-2) included cessation of fire from February 15, 2015, withdrawal of heavy armaments, as well as measures on long-term political settlement in Ukraine, in particular establishment of working subgroups.The subgroups focus on four areas: economic issues and restoration of facilities; refugees, internally displaced persons and humanitarian assistance; political issues; security issues.??????? ?? WWW.DONETSK.KP.RU: https://www.donetsk.kp.ru/daily/26852.5/3894247/??????? ?? WWW.DONETSK.KP.RU: https://www.donetsk.kp.ru/daily/26852.5/3894247/Dnieper lineTHE DNIPRO LINE is a defense line to protect Ukraine from the Turks-Tatars. aggression. The Dnieper Line was created to protect the southern borders of the Russian Empire from raids by the Crimean Tatars. The line was built instead of the Ukrainian line , which lost its significance in connection with the annexation of the lands of the so-called Wild Field to the Russian Empire at the end of the 18th century.Dnipro , the largest river in Ukraine and the third in Europe (larger than the Volga and Danube), has been connected with Ukrainian life since the dawn of history. people, the "sacred river" of Ukraine. The length is 2,285 km, of which 485 km are on the territory of the RSFSR, 595 km are on the territory of the BSSR, 115 km are the border of the Ukrainian SSR and the BSSR, and 1,090 km are on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. The size of the wasteland of D. is 503,000 km², including 289,000 km² on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR (48% of the entire Ukrainian SSR); 42% of the entire Ukrainian national territory and 36% of all Ukrainian ethnogr. landsThe new Dnipro line is the last stage of the liquidation of the Zaporizhzhya Cossacks. During the construction of D.u.l. Cossack winter quarters were evicted, forests were cut down to provide construction materials. Cossack regiments served in the fortifications of the line. Construction of D.u.l. completed the process of encirclement of Zaporizhzhya Volonties by Russian settlements and finally decided the fate of Zaporizhzhya Sich. It was created during the Russian-Turkish war of 17681774 . It consisted of a system of fortifications built along the south. borders of the Russian Empire , defined in 1742 in accordance with the Belgrade Peace Treaty of 1739. n her ban on Shcherbynin, Catherine II wrote: "... My thoughts, however, constantly strive for the prosperity and affirmation of the peaceful life of those people who were given to me by God, and therefore I considered it necessary that both the Little Russian and Slobid provinces should be forever cut off from the barbarians , to establish a line of fortresses from Berda to the Dnipro." Further, Kateryna notes that the land here is "fertile, abundant with rivers and various lands , therefore it is necessary to organize their settlement and profitability."On May 10, 1770, at the height of the Russo-Turkish campaign, the points approved by the Military Board entitled "Information on the construction of a line along the Berdi and Moskovtsi rivers" were approved, and on September 2, Catherine II issued a decree of the Senate on the construction of the Dnieper defense line . According to the decree , a fortified defensive line consisting of seven fortresses, separated by 30 versts from each other, was erected. The Dnipro line beganfrom the confluence of the Sukhy Moskovka River into the Dnipro, passed along the lines of the Konka (Kinski Vody) and Berda rivers, and ended on the coast of the Sea of ??Azov near the mouth of the Berda River. The entire line was planned to be built in 5 years. According to the initial estimate, the construction of the line should cost 1,200,000 rubles. However, already in 1770, this estimate was revised and cut in half.Construction began in August. 1770 on the lands of the Freedoms of the Zaporizhzhya Low-level Army . During the construction of D.u.l. the labor of resettled Russian peasants, military units of the regular army, and convicts was actively used. D.l. stretched more than 180 km from the Dnipro along the banks of the Kinski Vody (now the Kinska River) and Berda rivers to the Sea of ??Azov . It consisted of 7 fortifications, on the basis of which the cities of Oleksandrivsk (now the city of Zaporizhzhia ), Velikiy Tokmak (now the city of Tokmak) arose), with. Novopetrivka, Berdyansky District, Zaporizhzhia. region, and a continuous fortified line between the upper reaches of the Kinski Vody and Berda rivers with a length of approx. 9 km. Stone fortresses, for the most part, were connected by high earth ramparts and deep ditches. On the building D.l. tens of thousands of Ukrainians worked. and Russian Cossacks, local peasants and newly arrived workers - "shovelers". Fortifications arose first of all in the places of great Cossacks. winter quarters , where rural areas were grown. products, crafts and small trade developed, and this led to the destruction of the established economy of Zaporozhye. After the accession of the Crimean Khanate to Russia. of the empire 1783 D.l. as a whole, it lost its strategic importance and only the fortresses of Oleksandrivska and Petrivska kept their special status until the end of the century. 18th centuryD. l. stretched 180 km from the Dnipro to the city of Azov along the banks of the Konka (Kinska) and Berda rivers. I It consisted of 7 separate fortresses and a continuous fortified line (9 km) between the upper reaches of these rivers. listed in order of passage from the Dnipro to the Sea of ??Azov:1. Alexander fortress (battalion) - at the mouth of the river Sukha Moskovka, which flows into the Dnipro (now located in the territory of modern Zaporizhzhia)2. Nikitin Fortress (double-mouthed) - on the right bank of the Konka River, 20 versts from the exit to the Dnipro Valley. Currently, it is located in the territory of the modern Komyshuvakha township of the Orihiv district of the Zaporizhzhia region. On the site of the Mykytyn fortress, ramparts rising from one and a half to three meters and ditches half a meter deep have been preserved [2].3. Hryhorivska fortress (double-mouthed) - near the two rivers that flow into the valley of Verbova and Zherebets.4. Cyril's Fortress (double-mouthed) - on the right bank of the Konka River at the confluence with the Tokmachka River5. Oleksiiv fortress (double-mouthed) - at the source of the Berda River, which flows into the Sea of ??Azov6. Zakhariyivska fortress (double-mouthed) - on the left bank of the Berda River , opposite the "destroyed, unknown retrangement, from long ago" [3] (now located on the territory of the modern village of Kalaitanivka, Berdyan district, Zaporizhzhia region)7. Petrovsky Fortress (Sea Fortress of St. Peter) (battalion) - above the Sea of ??Azov at the mouth of the Berda River (now located on the territory of the modern village of Novopetrivka, Berdyansk District, Zaporizhzhia Region)After the accession of the Crimean Khanate to the Russian Empire in 1783, the Dnieper Line lost its significance and was abolished. Only the two largest fortresses - Oleksandrivska and Petrovska - were left , and even those were considered military objects only during the reign of Catherine II, being excluded from the list of border fortified points until 1800. Today, in addition to the remains of the Oleksandrivskaya and Petrovskaya fortresses, the remains of the earthen ramparts of the Zakharyevskaya fortress are now preserved.The width of the ditch along the bottom is chosen based on the fact that a tank that has fallen into such a ditch cannot turn around along the ditch, climb back along the slope. A depth of 2 meters, combined with a width of 2 meters, makes it impossible for a tank to use its weapons.Naturally, the anti-tank ditch should be covered by anti-tank fire and machine gun or sniper fire. Mining anti-aircraft mines with mines is permissible only in the opposite parapet, and the mines must be non-removable, otherwise the enemy can use them for blasting when arranging a passage across the ditch. The initial parapet can be mined with PP mines to hinder the work of enemy sappers.Governor Alexander Bogomaz spoke for the first time 18 June 2023, about the new line of defense on the territory of the Bryansk border region at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF). On the sidelines of the SPIEF, Governor Alexander Bogomaz gave many interviews to the federal media. One of them - the TV channel "Russia 1". Answering a correspondent's question about the behavior of local businesses in the current difficult conditions, the father of the Bryansk region gave a recent example, which is very indicative."The business behaves very responsibly. For example, we had to dig an anti-tank ditch [length] of 50 kilometers a week ago by the decision of our Ministry of Defense, the border guard, said Alexander Bogomaz, a fact hitherto unknown to the general public. The business did this work for free Not only was it free, but most importantly, it was very dangerous. That is, they were fired more than once. Nevertheless, people went for it and completed the task that is necessary to ensure the security of not only the Bryansk region, but our entire country.""Exactly where, in what part of the very long borderland of the Bryansk region, the mentioned anti-tank ditch was dug, Alexander Vasilyevich reasonably did not voice it. Bogomaz also boasted to the Russia 1 TV channel about the success of the regional economy and entrepreneurs from the Bryansk border region .Help "BV"Anti-tank trenches, also called anti-tank ditches, are ditches dug in and around fortified positions to contain the advance of enemy tanks. Such ditches were first used in the First World War. The anti-tank ditch must be wide and deep enough to prevent the tank from crossing.On the territory of the Russian border regions, they are preparing to defend themselves against Ukraine: they are preparing a "militia" and building a "Wagner Line". Ukrainian experts say that all these actions are not an attempt to protect territories, but part of propaganda.Military expert Mykola Salamakha said this in a commentary to Focus for the material "A campaign against Belgorod. Does Ukraine have the right to strike at Russian territory" ."All the military understand that in order to stop the enemy's offensive, it is necessary to lay minefields, prepare anti-tank barriers, ditches, hedgehogs. All this must be covered by barrage and concentrated artillery fire. Just barbed wire in several rows and an anti-tank ditch is not enough for defense. An anti-tank ditch , shots of 10 high-explosive fragmentation shells fall asleep. And the tanks built-in bulldozer equipment can fill up a ditch in 10 minutes. That is, in 15-20 minutes of work, a tank unit overcomes an anti-tank ditch, "he explained.According to Salamahi, the real lines of defense are created by specialized engineering units over several weeks and months. Serious lines in Europe and the former USSR were created for several years.That is, all this is calculated in order to calm the local population, or vice versa, to raise the level of patriotism and militancy. Allegedly, they are ready to defend their own land, they say, and the enemy will not pass. Such actions are an information war, including hanging noodles on the ears of Russians. Allegedly, the protection of the border areas is ready," the expert continued.In addition, the Russians are spreading panic among the population, trying to justify the launch of a special military operation - it was necessary, because Ukraine was really preparing to attack Russia, Salamaha concluded.Recall that the mercenaries of the private military company "Wagner" are trying to build a defensive line in the rear on the territory of the Luhansk region . "Prigozhin's Line" supposedly should cover the approaches to Lisichansk and Lugansk.IMPORTANTHike to Belgorod. Does Ukraine have the right to strike on Russian territoryAnti-tank defense lines were noticed in the Gorsky region of the Lugansk region . The invaders are digging trenches and creating two lines of concrete pyramids known as "dragon's teeth".The construction of an anti-tank ditch in front of the front line of defense has the following negative aspects:- the anti-tank ditch is clearly visible for ground and air reconnaissance and thereby gives out the location of the front line of defense, which makes it easier to suppress it with artillery and aircraft;- an anti-tank ditch can be destroyed by aimed artillery fire of the enemy in the same way as a weapon designed to cover it can be disabled;- the anti-tank ditch can serve as a convenient starting position for the enemy to attack our front line;- work on the construction of an anti-tank ditch has to be stopped when even insignificant enemy forces approach.It is very difficult to constantly keep the moat in good condition, while repair work can only be done at night.an anti-tank ditch can never hold back an advance of tanks, it can only slow it down and force the tanks to move in a certain direction. In themselves, obstacles (artificial or natural), without interaction with fire, are of relatively little importance - they only hamper the maneuver of tanks (especially on terrain crossed by ravines) and somewhat slow down their movement. In combination with fire, the anti-tank obstacle system is a powerful means of defense against tanks and at the same time against infantry.Military Barriers are artificial obstacles and barriers created in advance or during military operations in order to inflict losses on the enemy, to prevent the advance or maneuver of his troops on land, ships and other floating facilities on water, aviation flights in near-Earth space and the landing of aircraft (helicopters) on land. Depending on the place of application Z. in. there are ground, sea (lake, river) and air; according to the mode of action - explosive, non-explosive and combined. Z. in. can be used in all types of combat and operations. Explosive barriers are most widely used (eg Land mines , Sea mines ). In the defense, a system of various types of defense systems is being created. Ground Z. in. divided into anti-tank, anti-personnel, anti-vehicle and anti-amphibious. Anti-tank minefields include: anti-tank minefields, individual mines, land mines , scarps , counter-scarps, anti -tank ditches , funnels in the ground, reinforced concrete, wooden and metal gouges , forest and stone blockages , barriers, metal hedgehogs , traps, snow ramparts, floodingterrain, fires that impede the movement of troops. To anti-personnel Z. in. include: anti-personnel minefields, land mines, surprise mines, earthen ramparts, ditches, wolf pits (depressions in the ground in the form of a truncated cone), notches , blockages, wire fences, spiral nets, slingshots ,hedgehogs, snares, loops, thrown wire, electrified and water obstacles, fire shafts, etc. include: anti-vehicle mines, land mines used to destroy the bed of railways and highways, bridges, tunnels and road structures, digging up roads, making blockages, barricades, gouges, craters on the roads, mining the roadbed. Antiamphibious Z. in. arranged against air and sea landings. Anti-tank, anti-personnel, and other mines are used to counter airborne assaults, as well as ramparts, pits, poles, stones, ditches, wire nets, hedgehogs, and slingshots. Explosive and non-explosive barriers are set up on the coast and in the water against the landing of sea (lake, river) landings, as well as to counter the enemy in forcing water barriers, Sea (lake, river) Z. in. are used to prevent the passage of enemy ships along sea (lake) communications, fairways, rivers, canals, as well as to impede the penetration of enemy ships, submarines, torpedoes, and other floating craft into harbors, ports, raids, and to landing sites for sea (lake) , river) landings. When constructing such barriers, contact and non-contact sea (river) mines, floating booms, cable networks, gouges, rags, flyovers, etc. are used. Air Z. in. are used to prevent the flights of aircraft and other aircraft of the enemy in near-Earth space. As air Z. in. air barrage balloons are used, etc. Means for covering approaches to important objects in order to interfere with the actions of enemy aircraft at low altitudes and make dive bombing difficult. Z. in. have a long history. As ground Z. in. since ancient times, earthen ramparts, ditches, wolf pits, stone walls, wooden palisades, forest fences and blockages, and flooding of the area have been widely used; marine Z. in. - flyovers, robes, gouges and other means. In the 18th century for the device Z. in. Explosives gradually began to be used, and in the defense of Sevastopol in 185455, land mines began to be used. During the Russo-Japanese War of 190405, in the defense of Port Arthur, Russian troops used anti-personnel mines, electrically exploded field mines, and electrified wire obstacles. Various Z.'s are widely distributed. received during World War I 191418, especially the mining of the terrain, the creation of continuous strips of barbed wire. Russian military engineers - Gritskevich, Dragomirov, Revensky and others. developed during this war a number of designs of new anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, which were successfully used in the construction of obstacles. In England, Italy, and France, anti-aircraft barriers in the form of air barrage balloons were used for the first time in 1916 to protect London, Venice, and Paris. Before World War II (193945) in the fortified regions of European states and during the construction of the fortified lines of the Maginot (France), Mannerheim (Finland), Siegfried (Germany) and others. Metal, concrete, reinforced concrete, granite gouges, anti-tank ditches, wire nets, flooding and swamping of the area, forest blockages, minefields and land mines were set.During World War II (193945) and especially the Great Patriotic War of 194145, explosive barriers were widely used in all types of combat. In 1941, for the first time in 1941, Soviet troops began to use mobile barrier detachments to set them up in the battle near Moscow, which were later successfully used in other operations. During the war, the Soviet Army used up more than 70 million different mines, including about 30 million anti-tank mines. Simultaneously with the mining of the area, non-explosive rocket launchers were used. In the postwar period, the means used for the construction of various z. v., especially explosive ones, received considerable development. For this purpose, nuclear explosive devices (nuclear land mines), as well as ground (underground) explosions of nuclear munitions, can be used.Loose lips will destroyCitizen diplomacyAnti-tank ditch [protivotancos rove], is an artificial obstacle in the form of a wide and deep earthen ditch, torn off in front of the front edge of a defensive position or in the depths of defense in order to stop enemy tanks and defeat them with anti-tank fire. The ditch comes off with breaks, and the approaches to it are mined and covered with fire of all kinds. Etc. were widely used in the first period of the Great Patriotic War of 194145.Terrain factors such as built-up areas, vegetation, and soil form existing obstacles (natural and cultural). An obstacle is any obstruction that stops, delays, or restricts movement, and it can be either existing or reinforcing (conventional and dynamic). Rivers, swamps, marshes, forest, rock outcrops, wet soil, flooded areas are called natural obstacles; ditches, quarries, walls, buildings, canals, hedgerows are called cultural obstacles; tank traps, minefields, craters are called conventional reinforcing obstacles; and smoke is called a dynamic obstacle.Reinforcing obstacles may be added to develop an integrated barrier system that will force the enemy to conform to the friendly force battle plan. Reinforcing obstacles are used to close the gaps and to block or destroy the lanes in the existing obstacle area, or to strengthen weak areas. They are also used to extend existing obstacles or to develop obstacles in an obstacle-free area. The combination of natural and cultural obstacles will in most cases leave gaps in the terrain suitable for exploitation by the enemy. These gaps are broadly termed "avenues of approach". An avenue of approach is a route by which a force may reach an objective or key terrain. To be considered an avenue of approach, a route must provide enough width for the mobility of the force for which the avenue is being considered.A barrier system is a coordinated series of strongpoints, defense areas, and obstacles that are generally placed in a linear fashion. The barrier is sited on the strongest tactical terrain features available. It is fashioned, designed, or used to canalize, direct, restrict, delay, or stop the movement of an opposing force and to impose additional losses of personnel, time, and equipment on that force. All of this must be accomplished without inhibiting the movement of friendly troops. Usually, several barriers are employed to create a barrier system. The barrier is the synthesis of such terrain factors as built-up areas, vegetation, slope, etc., and reveals the existing (natural and/or cultural obstacle) framework within which reinforcing obstacles are woven to develop the barrier system. Finally, care is given to placement of covering fire and concealment of weapons. A forward barrier is located generally along a fon·1ard division's initial battle position. It consists of the defense areas and strong points in depth, coordinated fire of all weapons, and artificial and natural obstacles employed in depth for close-in projection and defense. It is not necessarily a continuous field of antitank and antipersonnel mines, but it combines all types of obstacles, both natural and artificial, and the fire of all 1-1eapons. It is sited on the strongest terrain features available and is the backbone of the defense. Depth to the forward barrier can be achieved by using a series of obstacles on the dangerous avenues of approach. These obstacles are covered by forces along the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). In establishing a forward barrier, units analyze the terrain to determine those areas that prevent the movement of tanks, or permit their passage only with great difficulty. Although each defense area is founded on the strongest combination of terrain features available, all areas may not be equally strong. When portions of the forward barriers are located on vulnerable terrain, the natural vulnerability of the terrain is reduced by using all types of artificial nb~tacles and coordinated defensive fire. Properly used obstacles are combat multipliers. They significantly enhance the relative value of weapons, especially antiarmor weapons. This enhancement results from siting reinforcing obstacles to take advantage of the following factors: (1) The probability of a hit is greater if the target is moving slowly or stopped; (2) Attacking enemy armored vehicles are clearly visible to direct-fire, antitank weapons while crossing "terrain windows" during their approach. In coordination with the siting of antitank weapons, the commander sites obstacles to take advantages of these factors. The obstacle slows or stops the attacking armored veilicle, thus turning a rapidly moving target into a slow or stationary one. At the same instant, the obstacle holds the attacker in a favorable, known position at a known range.Built-up areas are treated as an obs ta cl e to armor because they reduce the speed of the vehicles to approximately zero. If a built-up area lies within an otherwise high speed mobility corridor, it blocks this path to high speed armor. Obstacle systems are uniquely situated on specific terrain to maximize the delay of an attacking force. Most of the obstacles encountered along normal routes are simple structures which are overcome by a fairly obvious, straightforward response. However, a few can be complex systems which must be carefully examined to find their weaknesses. On some routes, tank ditches and berms are often the only obstacles. Even when obstacle systems are examined, the ditches and berms seemed to be the weak link when compared to fields of dragon's teeth. In most cases, selecting a lane is simply a matter of finding the easiest path to the obstacle (usually a ditch) and crossing it in the most direct manner. However, complex systems must be carefully examined to determine the best path through them.The 1973 Arab-Israeli War saw the re-emergence of an ancient terrain reinforcement concept in defensive operationsthe barrier ditch. Using antitank ditches supported by minefields, the Israeli Defense Force in the Golan Heights defeated an attacking Syrian force which enjoyed an overall 4 to 1 superiority in tanks and a 10 to 1 advantage in artillery. The Syrians were required to use armored dozers and armored vehicle launched bridges for breaching, thereby preventing a rapid advance and channeling them into predetermined kill zones. On today's battlefield, characterized by speed and mobility of forces and lethality of weapons systems, the antitank ditch is a valuable terrain reinforcer. The in- troduction of the antitank guided missile (ATGM) has greatly increased the ability of infantry to destroy tanks and is extremely valuable in overcoming the NATO disadvantage in numbers of armored vehicles. The antitank ditch stops a tank for two to five minutes, exposes lightly armored portions of the vehicle, and places its weapons systems in an ineffective attitude. It sets him up for the kill. The volume of earthwork required to cross an anti-tank ditch is calculated by comparing the volume of fill placed in the ditch to the volume of fill removed from the sides of the ditch. The earth removed from the sides of the ditch is pushed into the ditch. There it forms a berm over which vehicles can cross. Mathematically, incremental slices of the banks are removed until the total volume of earth removed from the banks equals the volume of earth within the ditch which forms the crossing berm. This volume is the one used for work estimates. In general, around the world Ditch Widths vary from 4 meters to 9 meters, while Ditch Depths range from 2 meters to 5 meters. Accordingn to US Army doctrine, to be effective against tanks, the ditch must be a minimum of 1.5 meters deep and 3.3 meters wide. The anti-tank ditch, having insignificant dimensions (width on top 3.5 m and depth 2.5 m), nevertheless affects the position of tanks when they move into battle, delaying them or changing their direction. At the same time, such a ditch, due to its small size, attracts a tank to overcome it, being in this case a trap.The use of the term 'Tank ditch' as opposed to 'Anti-tank ditch can be confusing, since the term "tank ditch" is also used for a protective measure used to prevent tanks from being seen when firing.A primary engineer role against armor attack is to slow or stop the enemy tank force long enough to permit engagement by friendly forces. US Army tests proved the effectiveness of the anti-tank ditch. The principles are simple, A ditch 5 meters wide, 1.5-2 meters in depth, is cut across the direction of the enemy's advance. The spoil from the cut is spread along the friendly side of the ditch, as close to the bank as soil conditions permit. Though a tank can get into the ditch , an entry perpendicular to the line of the ditch will stop all forward movement once the tank is inside. The sheer face of the friendly bank precludes the enemy tank from directly climhing to the friendly side. The narrow width of the ditch impedes turning the tank. The tank is therefore virtually frozen long enough to be engaged by friendly fire. An entry parallel to the line of the ditch allows the tank freedom of movement inside the ditch. However. the tank weapons systems are practically ineffective. Its restricted freedom of movement allows it to be more easily targeted by friendly fire. Finally, any attempt to bridge the gap by AVLB or earthen ramp results in two discouraging factors: 1) Lanes across the ditch become well defined allowing concentration of the friendly fire; 2) The climbing of the earth wall on the friendly side exposes the vulnerable underelly of the armored vehicle to friendly fire.While the ditch in itself is not by any means an impenetrable obstacle. it does serve to impede and /or channelize the enemy's advance, drawing them into a killing zone of lethal fire. Considering the present advanced state of tank and anti-tank weaponry. it could very w ell provide the edge that could turn the tide of a battle.The anti-tank ditch was part of the system of structures of the main line of defense of the city of Moscow. It was built during the autumn of 1941 by residents of the Krasnopolyansky district, military construction units under the guidance of military engineers - fortifiers. Its depth was 4 meters, the width along the top - 6 meters, along the bottom - 4 meters. Rupnikove linije
As a countermeasure to Italy's Alpine Wall, the Rupnik Line was built in Yugoslavia during the late 1930s, named after General Leon Rupnik. However, the line was scheduled to be completed by 1947, so when the German invasion began, any defense proved impossible. Subsequently, the fortifications were demolished to salvage valuable metals.
The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes declared its formation, later to be named Yugoslavia (literally Land of Southern Slavs). Almost immediately, border tensions grew over disputed land claims and in 1920 a third of the new countrys territory was ceded to Italy leading to the formation of the then border - the Rapallo Border.Later, in the 1930s with the threat of conflict once again rising on the European continent, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia commissioned an ambitious development of defensive fortifications.
The Rupnik Line is a system of fortifications that was built in the 1930s along the border of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (today's Slovenia). It was named after the Slovenian general Leon Rupnik who was the main organizer of the project. The fortifications were meant to defend the country against an invasion from Italy or Germany. According to the military doctrine of the time, it was still considered that the new war, which was inevitably approaching, would not be any different from the first, that is, it would be a positional one. and victory or defeat will be decided in the trenches and trenches.
The plans for the Rupnik Line were made by the army, but individual fortifications and bunkers were built by qualified professionals, such as the company Dukic from Ljubljana that worked in the area of kofja Loka. On 3 January 1938, the first Slovenian general Leon Rupnik, a native of the Primorska region (born in Lokve pri Gorici, 1880 shot in 1946 in Ljubljana), was named the commander-in-chief of military fortification works.
The Rupnik Line initially had around 15,000 people working on the construction of the line, but by the outbreak of war in 1939, there were around 40,000-60,000 soldiers and civilians constructing the vast series of concrete bunkers and other fortified positions. Lower foreman positions as well as some demanding works were taken up by the civilian population and local craftsmen. Workers, mostly reservist soldiers from all over Yugoslavia (according to some official estimates, about 40,000 of them), performed heavy manual labor, such as excavations, preparation of sand and transport of material. Often, donkeys and mules were also used for material transport.
The building of the fortifications brought residents a temporary solution for unemployment and financial troubles which affected them due to the border location. During its building, locals were employed as construction workers, porters or transporters of materials. Officers resided in elezniki, where the army headquarters were located, while ordinary soldiers lived in barracks in different locations. Cement, iron and mainly fuel were transported from kofja Loka to two bigger outdoor storage facilities near elezniki and Sua.
Even though the area of the Rupnik Line was strictly guarded by the military, ties were created between the locals and the soldiers. Locals told numerous stories, such as about recruits from Muslim parts of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, who were not willing to work with a pickaxe, if a cross was cut into the end of its helve, which was a common habit in the area at the time. Back then, many children also had the opportunity to learn Yugoslav languages. Seeing reservist soldiers swim in nearby rivers without clothes was often immoral for the locals, but mostly it was unusual.
The Rupnik Line was modeled after the French Maginot Line and the Czechoslovakian fortifications, being a line of bunkers, artillery positions, and various other fortifications along the Italian border and in strategically important positions inland. It was built mostly in the western and northern parts of Slovenia. Several hundred bunkers were built, among them there were also three underground defence blocks, named 'Hlavce njive', 'Hrastov gric' and 'Goli vrh', which were strategically of key importance in the defence against possible invasions towards Ljubljana by Italian soliders.
The entire Rupnik Line was divided to five sectors. In total, it consisted of twelve heavily fortified positions and around 4000 bunkers (popularly known as "obekt"), which were mostly built from fine ground dolomite sand, strong iron structures and cast iron slabs that were two centimetres thick around the openings. The majority of fortifications and bunkers in the area of the Selka valley are still preserved today, only some iron protection plates disappeared, being used by the locals for various purposes after the war.
The system was divided into two primary lines of defence. The first type of fortification, garrisoned in first defence line, included machine-gun bunkers, which formed a thick network, being only 150 300 m apart. The second defence line, which was built about 500 meters behind the first line, was composed of less individual bunkers, but they were bigger. In addition to bunkers, the defence system groups formed by the largest fortifications were part of the second line as well. Between the large buildings there were smaller anti-infantry bunkers built for two to seven soldiers. There was barbed wire installed between the buildings, while in the valley anti-tank barriers were also erected. Light-machine-gun and machine-gun bunkers, which represented the majority of defensive structures are best recognized by air vents for the extraction of fumes from firing weapons.
Interior panelling for concrete works was made from solid boards and, after the construction was completed, they also served as thermal insulation. Being constructed in a professional way and from high-quality material, almost all bunkers in the Selka valley have excellent insulation, so there is no moisture inside. Relationship between civilians and the army Between the first and the second line of bunkers, slightly above ground, there was about a 20 m wide barrier, intertwined with barbed wire, which was tied onto curved iron posts, dubbed by the local as "pigs' tails". These barriers bothered the locals more than anything, since they ran through their fields and pastures. The locals partly removed them already during the war, but the majority was removed immediately afterwards.
The Rupnik Line defences were originally intended to be completed by 1947. However, the Rupnik Line was never fully completed and, much like the Maginot Line in France, it didn't play a significant role during World War II. When Germany, Italy, and Hungary invaded Yugoslavia in April 1941, they bypassed most of the fortifications. The majority of the Rupnik Line fortifications were unfinished when the Italian army invaded Yugoslavia, just days after the Germans in April 1941.
After the war, many of the fortifications were destroyed or fell into disrepair. Some parts of the Rupnik Line still exist today and can be visited, offering a glimpse into the country's past. After the battle, everyone is a general, this time literally - the first objection against the general conclusion that the construction of all bunkers, forts and similar defensive buildings before the Second World War in Europe was superfluous, that it was just a waste of money and time the window.
Ukraines counteroffensive against Russian forces has been slower than desired, but Ukrainian forces will not be pressured into speeding up, the countrys President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said 22 June 2023. Ukrainian forces were being slowed in their advance by vast minefields laid by Russian forces, Zelenskyy told to the United Kingdoms BBC in an interview on Wednesday. With some 200,000 square kilometres (more than 77,000 square miles) of Ukrainian frontier territory littered with Russian land mines, the Ukrainian leader said that at stake is peoples lives. Some people believe this is a Hollywood movie and expect results now. Its not, Zelenskyy told the BBC. Whatever some might want, including attempts to pressure us, with all due respect, we will advance on the battlefield the way we deem best, he said.
Breaching operations are conducted to allow maneuver despite the presence of obstacles. Obstacle breaching is the employment of a combination of tactics and techniques to advance an attacking force to the far side of an obstacle that is covered by fire. It is perhaps the single, most difficult combat task a force can encounter.
Breaching operations begin when friendly forces detect an obstacle and begin to apply the breaching fundamentals, and they end when battle handover has occurred between follow-on forces and the unit conducting the breaching operation. Bulling through or forcing through is not a breaching operation. Bulling through is a decision made when a commander must react immediately to extricate his force from an untenable position within an obstacle and no other breaching operations are possible. When a force is in a minefield receiving fires and taking heavy losses, the commander may decide to immediately bull through the minefield rather than withdraw or reduce the obstacle.
A lane is a route through, over, or around an enemy or friendly obstacle that provides safe passage of a passing force. The route may be reduced and proofed as part of a breaching operation, be constructed as part of the obstacle, or be marked as a bypass. Reduction is a task to create and mark lanes through, over, or around an obstacle to allow the attacking force to accomplish its mission. Normally, engineers and reduction assets are used to reduce an obstacle. Proofing verifies that a lane is free of mines and that the width and trafficability of the point of breach are suitable for the assault force. Proofing is conducted when the risk of live mines remaining in the lane exceeds the risk of loss (lives and equipment) to enemy fires while waiting to complete proofing. Some mines are resistant to some reduction assets; for example, magnetically fused mines may be resistant to a mine-clearing line charge (MICLIC). Proofing is vitally important, however, the time available, the threat, or the mission may dictate that proofing not be done.
Suppression is a tactical task used to employ direct or indirect fires or an electronic attack on enemy personnel, weapons, or equipment to prevent or degrade enemy fires and observation of friendly forces. The purpose of suppression during breaching operations is to protect forces reducing and maneuvering through an obstacle. Obscuration must be employed to protect forces conducting obstacle reduction and the passage of assault forces. Obscuration hampers enemy observation and target acquisition and conceals friendly activities and movement. Obscuration smoke deployed on or near the enemy's position minimizes its vision.
Identifying the extent of the enemy's defenses is critical before selecting the appropriate technique to secure the point of breach. If the enemy controls the point of breach and cannot be adequately suppressed, the force must secure the point of breach before it can reduce the obstacle. The reduction element is comprised primarily of reduction assets (mine-clearing blades [MCBs], MICLICs, armored vehicle-launched bridges [AVLBs], armored combat earthmovers [ACEs], dismounted engineers, and so forth). It is normally responsible for reducing the obstacle.
The commander should plan for a 50 percent loss of mobility assets in close combat. As a planning factor, he should allocate one engineer platoon with the necessary reduction assets to create and mark one lane.The assault force must be sufficient in size to seize the point of penetration. Combat power is allocated to the assault force to achieve a minimum 3:1 ratio on the point of penetration.
Breaching is conducted by rapidly applying concentrated efforts at a point to reduce the obstacle and penetrate the defense. Massed combat power is directed against the enemy's weakness. The location selected for breaching depends largely on the weakness in the enemy's defense, where its covering fires are minimized. If friendly forces cannot find a natural weakness, they create one by fixing the majority of the enemy force and isolating a small portion of it for attack.
Breaching operations require precise synchronization of the breaching fundamentals by support, breach, and assault forces. The most effective synchronization tool available to the commander is the rehearsal. The inherent complexity of the breaching operation makes rehearsals at every level essential to success. Failure to synchronize effective suppression and obscuration with obstacle reduction and assault can result in rapid, devastating losses of friendly troops in the obstacle.Planning the breach without regard to actions on the objective leads to disaster.
In the chapel of the Wagner PMC in Goryachiy Klyuch, the first monument in Russia to those who died in the special operation zone was erected 27 July 2023. It is a pyramid from the Wagner Line with an alarm bell inside. Over 20,000 tokens in memory of the fallen soldiers of the Wagner PMC are engraved on the planes, reports the Telegram channel Unloading Wagner. According to the source, the monument will later be moved to the urban environment. It must be said that this is not the first monument in honor of those killed in the Northern Military District. In mid-July, the Tornado of Cranes memorial was opened in Tuapse. The musicians are buried under Goryachiy Klyuch, who indicated in a statement that in the event of death they want to be buried near the Wagner chapel. Prigozhin said that it is a dedication to those who died defending the Motherland. On July 30, 2023, the Wagner PMC base in Goryachiy Klyuch officially ceases to exist and was relocated to a new area. The flags were removed and transferred for storage to the Wagner memorial complex in Goryachy Klyuch. The chapel remains in place - especially since not far from it there is a cemetery where Wagner soldiers who laid down their lives for the Fatherland and their neighbors are buried. The chapel, the design of which was developed by the head of the PMC himself, Yevgeny Prigozhin, has little in common with a classic temple building. Externally it is dark gray, from a distance it is almost a black cube, topped with a dome with a cross.Similar small pyramids are installed on the graves of soldiers in some Wagner cemeteries. The mercenaries are buried in the village of Baku, on the outskirts of Goryachiy Klyuch. And over the past year, thanks to them, the local cemetery has grown greatly. The pyramids that look like dragons teeth: the same ones that were installed on the border with Ukraine, but gray, with Wagner emblems and the names of those buried under them. However, it is unclear whether people are lying under the pyramids: the dragons teeth are installed on a flat sandy area, three workers from Central Asia drag them in and install them in rows. In Baku, they mainly bury those fighters who have no relatives or whose relatives have abandoned them. Here lie many people who themselves demanded death and found themselves in demand of it ahead of time. They even have a slogan: Our business is death, and business is going well.
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